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STUDENT-LOAN DISCHARGE—AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
THE UNDUE HARSHIP PROVISION OF § 523(A)(8) UNDER
APPELLATE REVIEW
ABSTRACT
Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, student-loan debtors could
receive an automatic discharge of their debts in bankruptcy. Now, they cannot.
Since the Code’s enactment, Congress has pursued progressively harsher
standards, continually narrowing the scope of when a student-loan debtor
could obtain discharge. Following the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act in 2005, student-loan debtors now
encounter the toughest obstacles to discharge they have ever faced. By
extending the protection of the discharge exception of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) to
private lenders, Congress effectively placed all students who take out loans to
pay for their education at the mercy of a harsh system whose narrow
exceptions for discharge force debtors to prove that they face a “certainty of
hopelessness” in their future.
The harshness of this system is well documented by empirical studies
analyzing the results of bankruptcy courts applying the undue hardship
provision in § 523(a)(8). These studies paint a portrait of inconsistency and
subjectivity across the many judicial districts. Attempted application of the
undefined term “undue hardship” has resulted in multiple judicially-created
tests, the most predominant of which is the Brunner test, requiring a finding of
non-dischargeability if the debtor fails any of the test’s three prongs.
This Comment presents findings from an empirical study of ten years of
bankruptcy appellate decisions dealing with the undue hardship provision, an
area yet unexplored. Its findings reveal an enormous inequity in the treatment
of debtors and creditors in these cases. These findings suggest a
reconsideration of the current approach of the bankruptcy system toward
student-loan debt and whether the judicially-created tests have narrowed this
exception beyond what the Code intended. Furthermore, it recommends careful
assessment for practitioners considering an appeal on behalf of a debtor of an
unfavorable bankruptcy court decision.
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INTRODUCTION
Thomas Edison once said of his electric light, “None of my inventions has
cost me as much time, labor and study.”1 When Edison developed his light
bulb, the idea of electric light was nothing new. In fact, the idea had become
prevalent in scientific communities more than seventy-five years prior to
Edison’s invention.2 The effects of electricity had been studied for years, but as
the new age of science was ushered into being,3 Edison found purpose and
commercial application in the harnessing of electric light through a longlasting filament.4 He looked behind the veil of data and previous experiments
and discovered a way to make light a practical option for millions across
America. Speaking about his methods, Edison stated:
It has been said of me that my methods are empirical. That is
true . . . . So, when I am after a chemical result that I have in mind I
may make hundreds or thousands of experiments out of which there
may be one that promises results in the right direction. This I follow
up to its legitimate conclusion, discarding the others, and usually get
what I am after. There is no doubt about this being empirical; but
when it comes to problems of a mechanical nature, I want to tell you
that all I’ve ever tacked and solved have been by hard, logical
5
thinking.

This response showed the time and effort it took Edison to really understand
and apply his knowledge to craft an invention that would revolutionize the
world.
The herculean effort Edison applied to the light bulb is not so different
from what is required to fully understand the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) and
its application by courts. Indeed, Edison’s methods of empirical investigation
and hard, logical thinking should be applied to study and decipher the effects
of the Code’s application. Much like electric light, many of the effects of the
Code’s application have already been studied and reported. Specifically,
researchers and authors have produced significant data and results as it relates
1

THE QUOTABLE EDISON 27 (Michele Wehrwein Albion ed., 2011).
See Martin V. Melosi, THOMAS A. EDISON AND THE MODERNIZATION OF AMERICA 65–66 (Mark C.
Carnes ed., 2008). The first public demonstration of electric light was made in 1808 when Sir Humphrey Davy
unveiled his arc lighting invention, which had little commercial application until the late 1870s. See id. at 65.
Furthermore, Davy produced incandescence in 1802, but hundreds of experiments following this finding failed
to produce the type of lasting filament that Edison achieved. See id. at 66.
3 See id. at 65–66.
4 See id. at 70.
5 THE QUOTABLE EDISON, supra note 1, at 10.
2
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to how bankruptcy courts have applied the “undue hardship” provision from
§ 523(a)(8)’s exception to discharge.6 The challenge moving forward is to find,
much like Edison, a way to use and expand on that data to provide practitioners
and judges guidance and information that adds value to their decision-making
processes in this area of the law. This Comment, through an empirical study of
ten years of appellate decisions governing undue hardship determinations,
seeks to pull back the veil and provide an analysis of those courts whose
precedents have set the tone for student-loan discharge.
A look at recent news articles from around the United States reveals a
predominantly negative perspective on the financial outlook of a student-loan
debtor.7 Noting that student-loan debt has surpassed the $1 trillion mark, one
writer for the Chicago Sun-Times speculated that “student loans are about to
become a larger financial crisis than the mortgage disaster.”8 However, this
“sky is falling” perspective on student loans is nothing new. Since the Code’s
enactment in 1978, debtors have faced ever-tightening standards making
student loans harder to discharge. Prior to the Code’s enactment, student-loan
debt could be discharged automatically like many other loans in the bankruptcy
context.9 The Code imposed a new conditional discharge standard10 upon
student-loan debt, theoretically targeting rampant abuse of the bankruptcy
system. Legislators conjured images of college graduates freshly emerging
from their universities with advanced degrees in hand and bright futures who
might then seek to discharge their significant debt before accepting a high6 See Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the Undue Hardship
Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495 (2012); Rafael I. Pardo, Illness and Inability to Repay: The Role of Debtor
Health in the Discharge of Educational Debt, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 505 (2008); Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle
R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179
(2009) [hereinafter The Real Student-Loan Scandal]; Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in
the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV.
405 (2005) [hereinafter Undue Hardship].
7 See, e.g., Peter Coy, Student Loans: Debt for Life, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 18, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-09-06/student-loans-debt-for-life#p1; Ron Lieber, Last Plea on
School Loans: Proving a Hopeless Future, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/01/
business/shedding-student-loans-in-bankruptcy-is-an-uphill-battle.html?pagewanted=all;
Steve
Rhode,
American Households Sinking in Student Loan Debt Says Pew Research Center, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7,
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-rhode/american-households-sinki_b_1933143.html.
8 Terry Savage, Terry Savage: Federal Student Loans Next Big Crisis, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, (Oct. 13,
2012), http://www.suntimes.com/business/savage/15755472-452/terry-savage-federal-student-loans-next-bigcrisis.html.
9 Brendan Baker, Deeper Debt, Denial of Discharge: The Harsh Treatment of Student Loan Debt in
Bankruptcy, Recent Developments, and Proposed Reforms, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1213, 1214 (2012).
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012) (requiring the debtor prove that the student-loan debt would impose
an undue hardship on the debtor if not discharged).
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paying job.11 Even in the face of a study proving the contrary, Congress
enacted the new provision and has never looked back.12
An unfair debtor stereotype based on assumptions directly contradicted by
empirical evidence13 was only the beginning of the difficulty faced by studentloan debtors under the new undue hardship standard.14 The Code does not
define “undue hardship,”15 and the task has now fallen to the bankruptcy courts
to determine how to apply this standard. In response, bankruptcy courts
developed two predominant tests to assess whether a debtor’s student-loan debt
imposed an undue hardship: the totality of circumstances test and the threefactor Brunner test.16 Both tests analyze the same core considerations,17 and
likewise, both suffer from the same maladies—inconsistency and subjectivity.
The result is that these tests, which lean heavily on the court’s ability to predict
the future as to the debtor’s potential future income or wage earning ability,18
have created a system with an unsettling amount of judicial discretion and
subjectivity.19
Despite the broad-sweeping negative public outlook on student-loan debt,
the prejudicial stereotype faced by student-loan debtors, and the inconsistency

11 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 536–38 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6425 (insisting
that the average student debtor is trying to take advantage of a loophole in the system). Professors Rafael
Pardo and Michelle Lacey, in a 2005 study, addressed this abusive student-loan debtor stereotype thoroughly
and concluded that the justification of the change was built on bombastic and factually incorrect assertions. See
Undue Hardship, supra note 6, at 419–32.
12 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 133.
13 Id.
14 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
15 Section 523(a)(8) states that educational debt is excepted from discharge unless it “would impose an
undue hardship,” but the following subparagraphs and § 101 do not define what qualifies as an undue hardship.
See Id. §§ 101, 523(a)(8) (omitting any elaboration on what undue hardship means).
16 See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2nd Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(creating the Brunner test); Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews), 661 F.2d 702,
704 (8th Cir. 1981) (creating the totality of the circumstances test).
17 See Cheney v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Cheney), 280 B.R. 648, 659 (N.D. Iowa 2002).
18 The fact that this inquiry has been problematic is buttressed by an expansive 2005 study that looked at
numerous cases to try to find factual differences that underlay judicial determinations. See Undue Hardship,
supra note 6, at 503. The results of this study suggest that there is a great amount of inconsistency in judicial
determinations when applying different facts to these vague standards. See id. (finding few statistically
significant differences between debtors found to have a future ability to repay and those with a future inability
to repay).
19 Professor Douglass Boshkoff stated in his article that “experience with the conditional discharge of
educational debts in our country suggests that the bankruptcy judge will be given almost unlimited power to
determine the lifestyle of a debtor who seeks a discharge.” Douglass G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional and
Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 125 (1982).

FREEMAN GALLEYSPROOFS

2013]

2/25/2014 9:16 AM

STUDENT-LOAN DISCHARGE

151

produced by judicially created tests, a 2009 study of 115 bankruptcy filings in
the Western District of Washington indicated that 57% of those who filed
adversary proceedings seeking discharge of their student loans were able to get
some or all of their loans discharged.20 So, why does the negativity associated
with attempting to discharge student loans persist? The same study further
concluded that, even in light of the data showing that more than half of the
debtors studied received discharge of at least some of their student-loan debt,
the Code’s undue hardship discharge provision has failed to optimize the
financial health of debtors in distress.21 Furthermore, because the study found
that courts relied more heavily on extralegal factors than legal factors to make
relief determinations, it also asserted that the discharge determination process
exhibited “hallmarks of a system that has run amok.”22 Thus, even with some
measureable degree of success for student-loan debtors in dire need of
financial relief, the bankruptcy system remains plagued by an inconsistent
message from the bankruptcy courts and, ultimately, Congress—anyone can
receive educational loans, but it takes a very special person to discharge them.
This Comment will build on research that has documented the symptomatic
problems that bankruptcy courts have had in applying the Code’s undue
hardship provision. Ultimately, this Comment aims to provide practitioners
with new information about the approach appellate courts have taken when
considering lower court determinations of undue hardship. To accomplish this
goal, this Comment will present findings from an empirical analysis of ten
years of bankruptcy appellate opinions spanning from January 1, 2002, to
December 31, 2011.
This Comment is organized into four parts. Part I explains the background
and development of law surrounding the application of the undue hardship
20

The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 184.
Id. at 235.
22 Id. This article also postulated that the “higher education finance system suffers from schizophrenia—
namely, a public-oriented approach to student-loan origination but a business-oriented approach to studentloan collection.” Id. This view echoes the concerns voiced at the time of the Code’s enactment:
21

[I]f [student] loans are granted too freely and that is what is causing the increase in bankruptcies,
then the problem is a general problem, not a bankruptcy problem. The loan program should be
tightened, or collection efforts should be increased. If neither of those alternatives is acceptable,
then the loan programs should be viewed as general social legislation that has an associated cost.
It is inappropriate to view the program as social legislation when granting the loans, but strictly
as business when attempting to collect. Such inconsistency does not square with general
bankruptcy policy.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 134 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6095.
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provision. Part I.A discusses discharge in bankruptcy proceedings generally,
the undue hardship discharge provision and the legislative history prior to its
enactment, and the rapid expansion of the exception to discharge. Part I.B
examines the two judicially-created tests that courts use to determine whether a
debtor has met his or her undue hardship burden and the problems these tests
present. Part I.C analyzes the procedural requirements of the undue hardship
provision and how they comport with the Code’s overarching principles
concerning the scope of a debtor’s opportunity for a fresh start.
Part II addresses the bankruptcy appellate system as a whole. Part II.A
outlines the function of this Comment’s study. Part II.B provides an overview
of the unique structure of the bankruptcy appellate system. Part II.C delineates
the appellate process. Finally, Part II.D discusses the reasons why parties seek
to appeal determinations of undue hardship.
Part III then presents the empirical study of bankruptcy appellate opinions.
Part III.A discusses the methodology by which opinions were selected for
analysis, while Part III.B presents the findings of this study and its conclusions.
Finally, this Comment concludes in Part IV with reflections on the results of
the study and how these results relate to the principles of bankruptcy. More
specifically, this Comment will discuss the study’s implications for
practitioners as they make choices about how to effectively maneuver through
the bankruptcy appellate system and for judges as they consider undue
hardship determination on appeal.
I. THE UNDUE HARDSHIP DISCHARGE PROVISION—A LOOK AT ITS HISTORY,
APPLICATION, AND DIFFICULTIES AT THE BANKRUPTCY COURT LEVEL
This Part begins with a discussion of the underlying policies of bankruptcy
effectuated by the discharge of debt and describes the history behind the undue
hardship provision’s enactment and subsequent legislation. Part I.B will
discuss the application of the two judicially-created tests to determine whether
a debtor has proven undue hardship and provide a critique of their results.
Finally, Part I.C concludes with a critique of the procedural difficulties
presented by the undue hardship discharge provision.
A. The Development and Progression of § 523(a)(8)’s Undue Hardship
Provision
The bankruptcy system has two foundational principles that guide the
interpretations of the Code’s law and policy: (1) a fresh start for the debtor (the
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“fresh start principle”) and (2) equal treatment of similarly situated creditors
(the “equality principle”).23 The fresh start principle is based on “the notion
that substantive relief should be afforded in the form of forgiveness of existing
debt, with relinquishment by the debtor of . . . existing nonexempt assets.”24
The equality principle provides a basis for the procedural processes of the
Code that seek to maximize collection efforts of creditors when the debtor has
insufficient assets to repay.25
Within the context of chapter 7, debt discharge is generally automatic.26
After a debtor has filed a petition for bankruptcy, a creditor must file a proof of
claim to receive any compensation that might result from the liquidation of the
debtor’s assets.27 Once the creditor’s allowable claim is calculated28 and the
distribution of the debtor’s assets is completed,29 the debtor’s remaining debt is
automatically discharged,30 relieving the debtor of personal liability for his or
her outstanding debts.31 The automatic discharge is subject to certain
exceptions32 where Congress deemed the interest in full recovery of debt to
outweigh the debtor’s interest in a fresh start.33

23 See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5793; H.R. REP. NO. 95595, at 177–78.
24 Undue Hardship, supra note 6, at 414–15; see Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)
(stating that the fresh start policy of bankruptcy law gives a debtor who surrenders property for distribution to
creditors freedom from pre-existing debt).
25 See Undue Hardship, supra note 6, at 415 (noting that the bankruptcy system solves the “common
pool problem” that can arise if creditors only pursue their own interests at the cost of other creditors) (citing
Thomas H. Jackson, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 7–19 (1986) (giving a comprehensive
analysis of the role of bankruptcy law as a “collective debt-collection device”)).
26 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2012) (“The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
27 See id. § 501(a). But, note that creditors do not file proof of claims in no-asset chapter 7 cases.
28 See id. §§ 502, 506.
29 See id. §§ 725–26.
30 See id. § 727(a) (“The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless . . .”) (emphasis added).
31 See id. § 727(b) (“[T]his section discharges the debtor from . . . any liability on a claim.”).
32 See id. §§ 523, 727.
33 See Patel v. Shamrock Floorcovering Servs., Inc. (In re Patel), 565 F.3d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 2009)
(noting that the statutory exceptions to discharge recognize Congressional intent to protect certain creditors
from harm); Miller v. Lewis, 391 B.R. 380, 384 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (stating that certain debts, for public policy
reasons, have been decided by Congress to override policies favoring a fresh start); Bolen v. Sallie Mae
Servicing Corp. (In re Bolen), 287 B.R. 127, 129 (D. Vt. 2002) (noting that there are certain circumstances
where giving the debtor a fresh start is not the paramount concern and that protection of the creditor is more
important).
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Unlike other discharge exceptions, Congress deemed that the student-loan
debt discharge exception needed additional protection from discharge.34
Curiously, the student-loan debt exception is not particularly straightforward.
Rather, student-loan debt is unique because its exception from dischargeability
creates a very specific test or condition upon which it can be discharged.35 This
has not always been the case. Prior to the Code’s enactment, student-loan debt
was automatically dischargeable.36 However, fear of abuse by student-loan
debtors led to the addition of the undue hardship test to determine whether a
debtor could obtain relief.37 At its inception, then, § 523(a)(8)’s undue
hardship provision was unduly slanted against the student-loan debtor.
Analyzing this supposed slant, Rafael Pardo, a prominent bankruptcy law
professor, and Michelle Lacey, an accomplished mathematics professor,
performed an empirical study to examine this supposed rampant abuse and the
effects of applying the undue hardship provision.38 Their study found an
unearned, negative stereotype of the student-loan debtor presented in the
legislative history of the enactment of the Code.39 Furthermore, their study

34

See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
See id. (creating the condition of “undue hardship” to be able to discharge student-loan debt).
36 See id. § 35(a) (1976) (omitting educational debt from the list of debts unaffected by discharge)
(repealed 1978).
37 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 536–38 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6425.
38 Undue Hardship, supra note 6.
39 Id. at 419–28. Arguing against the enactment of the undue hardship provision, Representative James
O’Hara stated that the provision was “a discriminatory remedy for a ‘scandal’ which exists primarily in the
imagination.” See H.R. REP NO. 94-1232 (1976), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 148, and in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6109. Representative O’Hara decried the provision for likening the Code’s treatment of
student-loan debtors to those who obtain loans by “fraud, felony, and alimony-dodging.” Id. (asserting that the
new provision subjects educational loans to an assumption of criminality). Further substantiating
Representative O’Hara’s claims, a GAO study performed before the provision officially became law
“indicated that less than one percent of all federally insured and guaranteed educational loans were discharged
in bankruptcy.” Undue Hardship, supra note 6, at 423; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 133.
In the face of such convincing evidence, Representative Allen E. Ertel opposed the removal of the
undue hardship provision by resorting to unsubstantiated and unrealistic characterizations of student-loan
debtors as bad faith actors who would inevitably abuse the bankruptcy system. See Undue Hardship, supra
note 6, at 424; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 536–38. Representative Ertel insisted that, without the undue hardship
provision, the law would “encourage fraud,” and, furthermore, student-loan debtors would simply take
advantage of a free education, immediately discharge their debts upon graduation, and begin their promising
careers with a “clean slate” and the “excellent credit rating that accompanies a bankruptcy.” See H.R. Rep. No.
95-595, at 536–38. Contra Undue Hardship, supra note 6, at 424 (disputing Representative Ertels’s assertion
that bankruptcy results in excellent credit ratings). Siding ultimately with Representative Ertel, Congress
enacted the provision, which therefore, at its inception, vilified the student-loan debtor. Sadly, courts have
embraced this lopsided stereotype when applying the law. See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mersmann (In re
Mersmann), 505 F.3d 1033, 1042 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Limitations on the discharge ability [sic] of student loans
35
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concluded that the landscape of student-loan debtors is not so inundated with
abusers of the bankruptcy system, as Congress had feared upon enactment of
the Code.40
However, since its inception, the Code’s student-loan exception has
progressively become more protective of student-loan lenders and harsher in
its treatment of student-loan debtors. In its initial iteration, the exception
provided the option of discharge both under the undue hardship test and when
a debt “first became due before five years before the date of the filing of the
petition.”41 In 1990, Congress extended the five-year exception to seven
years.42 In 1998, Congress eliminated the seven-year exception altogether43
and left student-loan debtors with only the undue hardship test for relief. Most
recently, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005 (“BAPCPA”) expanded the coverage of § 523(a)(8)’s protection to
private, for-profit lenders.44 The BAPCPA amendment further reflects
Congress’s pro-lender stance and represents the latest step in the progression of
§ 523(a)(8) and its attempt to curtail the bankruptcy relief available to studentloan debtors.45

serve [to] ‘prevent[] abuses of the educational loan system by restricting the ability to discharge a student loan
shortly after a student’s graduation . . . .’”); Undue Hardship, supra note 6, at 427 n.112.
40 Undue Hardship, supra note 6, at 459.
41 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549, 2591 (1978) (formerly
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A) (1988)).
42 See Robert C. Cloud, When Does Repaying a Student Loan Become an Undue Hardship?, 185 EDUC.
L. REP. 783, 786 n.20 (2004).
43 See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971(a), 112 Stat. 1581 (1998).
Interestingly, this amendment came in the wake of a 1997 report by the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission recommending that Congress eliminate § 523(a)(8) altogether. See NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW
COMM’N, FINAL REPORT, § 1.4.5 (October 20, 1997). The report went on to say that student loans should be
“treated like all other unsecured debts. In so doing, the dischargeability provisions would be consistent with
federal policy to encourage educational endeavors. . . . Litigation over ‘undue hardship’ would be eliminated,
so that the discharge of student loans no longer would be denied to those who need it most.” Id.
44 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220,
119 Stat. 23, 59 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (2012)).
45 See The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 180–82 (expounding on the impact of the 2005
amendments, the unregulated nature of private student loans, and the creditor-friendly policies of Congress).
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B. The Judicially Created Tests to Assess a Debtor’s Claim of Undue
Hardship
The application of the undue hardship provision in bankruptcy courts has
been plagued with inconsistency,46 which has primarily resulted from
significant judicial subjectivity in undue hardship determinations.47 Congress
failed to define what undue hardship meant when § 523(a)(8) was created,48
and in the wake of its vague wording, courts created two principal tests to
assess a debtor’s claim of undue hardship: (1) the Brunner test49 and (2) the
totality of the circumstances test.50 The Brunner test is the predominant test
used by most circuits, but this section will address both tests in turn and
critique their shortcomings in litigation at the bankruptcy court level.
1. The Brunner Test
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Brunner v. New York State Higher
Education Services Corp. has become the principal standard for judging
whether a debtor has shown that he or she will suffer undue hardship without
the discharge of his or her student-loan debt.51 The Brunner test requires:

46

Despite Congress’ repeated re-drafting of § 523(a)(8), incrementally limiting the ability to discharge
student-loan debt, they never attempted to define the core provision of exception—undue hardship. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 101, 523(a)(8) (omitting any elaboration on what undue hardship means); supra Part I.A.
47 See Undue Hardship, supra note 6, at 503 (faulting judicial discretion for the haphazard results in
undue hardship litigation and for compromising the fresh start principle). Subjectivity here refers to the overall
application of the undue hardship provision across all districts. Although courts find themselves simply limited
by precedents today, the precedents differ from district to district and are the result of an initial judge’s
determination that they would allow or disallow some expense when determining dischargeability. Because the
precedents differ, the overall result is indicative of the initial subjective determinations.
48 Section 523(a)(8) states that educational debt is excepted from discharge unless it “would impose an
undue hardship,” but the following subparagraphs and § 101 of the Code do not define what qualifies as an
undue hardship. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 523(a)(8) (omitting any elaboration on what undue hardship means).
49 See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2nd Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
50 See Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews), 661 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir.
1981).
51 Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. The court in Brunner, recognizing that there was little appellate guidance
concerning the undue hardship provision, took the opportunity to weigh in and formally adopt the test spelled
out in the District Court from which this appeal originated. Id. Quickly analyzing each of the three prongs in
turn, the court noted that prongs one and three comported with common sense and the legislative intent behind
§ 523(a)(8). Id. Though it recognized the second prong was “problematic,” the court ultimately held that
requiring evidence that a hardship would continue into the future “more reliably guarantees that the hardship
presented is ‘undue.’” Id.
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(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and
expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself and her
dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional
circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student
loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the
52
loans.

A debtor must establish that he or she meets the standard of each prong to
satisfy the undue hardship provision.53
Judicial application of the three prongs of the Brunner test has generated
many difficulties for student-loan debtors. To prevail under the first prong—
the current inability to repay—a debtor must establish that, based on his or her
current income and expenses, repayment of the student-loan debt would force
the debtor to fall beneath a “minimal standard of living.”54 Courts have
interpreted this first prong to call for an analysis of the debtor’s income and
expenses, finding that when expenses exceed income, “the debtor will have
established an inability to maintain a standard of living in absence of an undue
hardship discharge.”55 However, analyzing income and expenses to determine
what constitutes a minimal standard of living and whether the debtor may fall
beneath it is a fact-intensive inquiry that allows for considerable amounts of
judicial subjectivity because of an ambiguous standard and differing
interpretations of what constitutes “minimal living.”56 Thus, what should be a

52

Id.
See id. (requiring each prong be met in order to afford relief); Pobiner v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In
re Pobiner), 309 B.R. 405 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2004); Williams v. EFG Tech/Rutgers (In re Williams), 296 B.R.
128 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2003); Shankwiler v. Nat’l Student Loan Mktg. (In re Shankwiler), 208 B.R. 701 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1997). It also bears noting that once the debtor establishes that he or she would suffer undue
hardship, courts have differed in their approach as to whether this entitles the debtor to the full discharge of his
or her debt or a partial discharge that brings the student-loan debt level down to a judicially determined
manageable level. See Amanda M. Foster, All or Nothing: Partial Discharge of Student Loans Is Not the
Answer to Perceived Unfairness of the Undue Hardship Exception, 16 WIDENER L.J. 1053, 1072–83 (2007)
The circuit courts are split over this issue, and scholars on both sides of the argument have advocated strongly
for congressional clarification. See Frank T. Bayuk, The Superiority of Partial Discharge for Student Loans
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8): Ensuring a Meaningful Existence for the Undue Hardship Exception, 31 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1091, 1116 (2004) (arguing that partial discharge better comports with ideals of economic and
fundamental fairness for both the creditor and debtor); Foster, supra, at 1073 (arguing that the Code, based on
plain meaning and statutory construction, legislative history, and principles of fairness, requires a strict, all-ornothing approach, awarding the debtor full discharge if he or she meets the undue hardship standard).
54 See generally Brunner, 831 F.2d 395.
55 See The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 196–97 n.76.
56 See Hart v. ECMC (In re Hart), 438 B.R. 406, 410 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (requiring the debtor to show he
is currently minimizing his expenses); Innes v. Kansas (In re Innes), 284 B.R. 496, 509 (D. Kan. 2002)
53
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straightforward test to determine if expenses exceed income may morph into
an opportunity for a judge to mandate what kind of cable TV or wireless phone
plan the debtor should have.57
Should the debtor establish his or her current inability to repay, he or she
must then demonstrate that the less than minimal standard of living will persist
if the student-loan debt is not discharged.58 Put more simply, the debtor’s
current inability to repay is not enough; it must be clear that the debtor will be
unable to repay in the future.59 Bankruptcy courts have found this prong to be
the most important, insisting that a debtor “must show that circumstances
indicate a certainty of hopelessness, not merely a present inability to fulfill
financial commitment.”60 Courts have attempted to analyze the debtor’s future
inability to repay upon certain objective factors,61 but even these factors allow

(determining that when a debtor’s expenses exceed their income they cannot maintain a minimal standard of
living and repay their loan); Pincus v. Graduate Loan Ctr. (In re Pincus), 280 B.R. 303, 317 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2002) (holding that a debtor is not required to live below the poverty line but must show that repayment will
require more than a restricted budget); The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 196–97 n.76
(highlighting the Ninth Circuit’s approach requiring that the debtor fall somewhere between “‘temporary
financial adversity’ and ‘utter hopelessness’” to satisfy the first prong). It is in applying the facts of a debtor’s
expenses to these vague standards that a judge is able to impose a significant amount of subjectivity. See
Pincus, 280 B.R. at 317 (finding a debtor’s expenses excessive in the areas of “(1) communication, (2) cable,
(3) food, (4) clothing, (5) laundry and dry-cleaning, (6) transportation, (7) recreation, and (8) certain medical
expenses” and further suggesting the debtor could have used more inexpensive cell phone contract plans, eaten
out less, and washed his own clothes).
57 See Pincus, 280 B.R. at 317.
58 See Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
59 See id.; Sanborn v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Sanborn), 431 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010)
(holding that the debtor must show that their condition of undue hardship will continue into the future).
60 Wallace v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Wallace), 443 B.R. 781, 789 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010)
(quoting Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 359 (6th Cir. 2007)).
61 See id. (asserting that the court may consider such circumstances as illness, disability, a lack of useable
job skills, or the existence of a large number of dependents); Barrett, 487 F.3d at 359 (holding that the
overarching principle that should determine whether the debtor satisfies this prong must be that the additional
circumstances be “beyond the debtor’s control, not borne of free choice”). The Ninth Circuit has attempted to
identify a list of factors that might be useful in determining whether the debtor will have a future inability to
pay. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nys (In re Nys), 446 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir. 2006). These factors, otherwise
known as the Nys factors, include:
(1) Serious mental or physical disability of the debtor or the debtor’s dependents which prevents
employment or advancement; (2) The debtor’s obligations to care for dependents; (3) Lack of, or
severely limited education; (4) Poor quality of education; (5) Lack of usable or marketable job
skills; (6) Underemployment; (7) Maximized income potential in the chosen educational field,
and no other more lucrative job skills; (8) Limited number of years remaining in [the debtor’s]
work life to allow payment of the loan; (9) Age or other factors that prevent retraining or
relocation as a means for payment of the loan; (10) Lack of assets, whether or not exempt, which
could be used to pay the loan; (11) Potentially increasing expenses that outweigh any potential
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for significant judicial interpretation and speculation.62 However, speculation
on the judge’s part is inherent in an inquiry that essentially asks the judge to
predict the future.63 This prong is extremely problematic because it is unclear
exactly how a student-loan debtor can prove that his or her situation falls into
the area envisioned by the Brunner test as sufficiently hopeless to warrant a
grant of discharge. Evidence from a 2007 study suggests a debtor’s health
status is likely to have the most statistically significant association with
discharge determination in a student-loan debtor’s case.64 Ultimately, though,
this crystal-ball-gazing exercise performed by courts is fraught with
subjectivity and guesswork.
Finally, debtors must establish that they have made a good faith effort to
repay their loans, which the court assesses by looking at the debtor’s
prepetition conduct.65 Courts have recognized that good faith is “both an
intangible and subjective standard,”66 which has resulted in even more
inconsistent application of the Brunner test.67 Factors vary from circuit to
circuit, but most circuits analyze some form of the following four factors to
determine whether a debtor has made a good faith effort to repay:
(1) whether the debtor attempts to repay the debt; (2) the length of
time after the student loan becomes due that the debtor seeks to
discharge the debt; (3) the percentage of the student loan debt in

appreciation in the value of the debtor’s assets and/or likely increases in the debtor’s income;
(12) Lack of better financial options elsewhere.
Id.
62 See The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 196–97 n.76 (finding, in a study of cases in the
Ninth Circuit, reliance on extralegal factors, such as what judge decided the case, to be more significant in the
outcome of whether a debtor satisfied the second prong of Brunner).
63 Roundtree-Crawley v. Educ Credit Mgmt. Corp., (In re Crawley), 460 B.R. 421, 439 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
2011) (noting that the inquiry is forward-looking in nature); Berry v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Berry),
266 B.R. 359, 364 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000) (recognizing that any analysis under the second prong of Brunner
is, by its very nature, speculative).
64 See Pardo, supra note 6, at 510–12 (finding in a study of a decade of bankruptcy decisions that the
debtor’s health played the largest role, even eclipsing a debtor’s monthly household income and expenses, in a
bankruptcy court’s determination of undue hardship).
65 Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396 (finding that the debtor did not act in good faith by filing for discharge only
within a month from when the first payment was due and by failing to take less drastic remedies before filing
for discharge).
66 E.g., Grine v. Tex. Guar. Student Loan Corp. (In re Grine), 254 B.R. 191, 193 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2000).
67 See The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 200 & n.98 (2009) (noting the “inherent
subjectivity in an amorphous standard such as good faith”).
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relation to the debtor’s total indebtedness; (4) the debtor’s attempts to
68
find suitable employment.

Basically, a court must determine whether a debtor has tried to find work,
maximize income, and minimize expenses.69 Holding consistent with the other
prongs in the Brunner test, this prong opens the door to a fact intensive inquiry
by judges, who have historically applied the standard from a “less forgiving
stance.”70 All in all, the Brunner test reflects the general attitude of the Code’s
progressively harsher stance toward student-loan debtors, resulting in a test
that is extremely technical and leaves very little room for a debtor to succeed.71
2. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
Offering an alternative to the Brunner test, the Eighth Circuit has officially
adopted the totality of the circumstances test.72 Analysis under this test
requires the court to consider: “(1) the debtor’s past, present, and reasonably
reliable future financial resources; (2) a calculation of the debtor’s and her
dependent’s reasonable necessary living expenses; and (3) any other relevant
facts and circumstances surrounding each particular bankruptcy case.”73

68 Green v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Green), 238 B.R. 727, 736 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999)
(citations omitted); see Hart v. ECMC (In re Hart), 438 B.R. 406, 413 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Dep’t of Educ. v.
Wallace (In re Wallace), 259 B.R. 170, 185 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (citations omitted).
69 Afflitto v. United States (In re Afflitto), 273 B.R. 162, 171–72 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2001) (citing
Goulet v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp. (In re Goulet), 264 B.R. 527, 531 (W.D. Wis. 2001)) (finding that not making
repayments does not preclude a finding of good faith if the debtor has sought to maximize income potential
and minimize expenses); see also Downey v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (In re Downey), 255 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr. N.D.
Fla. 2000) (deciding good faith was not established because debtor failed to show she minimized her
expenses).
70 The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 200; see Katheryn E. Hancock, A Certainty of
Hopelessness: Debt, Depression, and the Discharge of Student Loans under the Bankruptcy Code, 33 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 151, 156 (2009) (arguing that application of the good faith prong is unduly harsh based upon
the strict approach originally taken when § 523(a)(8) was enacted and debtors still had the option to come back
and have their loans discharged automatically without having to prove undue hardship).
71 See, e.g., H. AMEND. 939 to H.R. 4137 (offered Feb. 7, 2008) (striking down a proposed amendment to
repeal protection afforded to private student-loan lenders).
72 See Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews), 661 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir.
1981) (expressing a preference for a less restrictive test); see also Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re
Long), 322 F.3d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 2003) (formally embracing the Andrews opinion). This approach has been
endorsed by not only the Eighth Circuit, but also by courts within the First Circuit. Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bronsdon), 435 B.R. 791, 800 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2010).
73 Long, 322 F.3d at 554 (citing Andrews, 661 F.2d at 704); see also Ackley v. Sallie Mae Student Loans
(In re Ackley), 463 B.R. 146, 149 (Bankr. D. Me. 2011) (implementing a similar three-prong test). An
expanded list of facts and circumstances to which bankruptcy courts may look to determine whether the debtor
is entitled to an undue hardship discharge include:
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Ultimately, in adopting the totality of the circumstances test, courts look at
many of the same facts as those that apply the Brunner test to determine
whether the debtor has proven undue hardship.74
Much like the analysis under the Brunner test, a multifactor test like the
totality of the circumstances allows for considerable amounts of judicial
discretion and subjectivity. “The ‘totality of the circumstances’ is obviously a
very broad test, giving [courts] considerable flexibility.”75 This test is generally
viewed as less restrictive than the Brunner test because it allows consideration
of a wider range of factors.76 Notably, these two tests differ in that under the
totality of the circumstances test, no factor is dispositive; a finding against the
debtor on a particular factor does not necessitate automatic denial of
discharge.77 However, both tests focus on the same core considerations78—the
debtor’s financial ability to repay and the debtor’s conduct—which has led to
similar issues with inconsistency and judicial subjectivity. Thus, here too,
student-loan debtors face the same systemic message that the law is slanted
against them with little hope of escaping the unfair stereotype.

(1) debtor’s total present and future incapacity to pay debts for reasons not within control of
debtor; (2) whether debtor has made good faith effort to negotiate a deferment or forbearance of
payment; (3) whether hardship will be long-term; (4) whether debtor has made payments on
student loans; (5) whether debtor suffers from permanent or long-term disability; (6) ability of
debtor to obtain gainful employment in area of study; (7) whether debtor has made good faith
effort to maximize income and minimize expenses; (8) whether dominant purpose of bankruptcy
petition is to discharge student loans; and (9) ratio of student loan debt to debtor’s total
indebtedness.
D’Ettore v. Devry Inst. of Tech. (In re D’Ettore), 106 B.R. 715, 718 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (citations
omitted); see also Holmes v. NCO Fin. Sys. (In re Holmes), 319 B.R. 620, 622–23 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004);
Houshmand v. Mo. Student Loan Program (In re Houshmand), 320 B.R. 917, 920 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004);
Morgan v. Dep’t of Higher Educ. (In re Morgan), 247 B.R. 776, 782 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2000) (citing In re
D’Ettore, 106 B.R. at 718).
74 See Pardo, supra note 6, at 515 nn.41–42 (showing different tests analyzing similar factors, with
debtor illness emerging as a prominent consideration under both tests).
75 Houshmand, 320 B.R. at 920; see Dep’t of Educ. v. Meling (In re Meling), 263 B.R. 275, 278–79
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001), aff’d, No. C01-2027, 2002 WL 32107248 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 22, 2002) (noting that
courts have broad latitude to consider any relevant factor).
76 See Houshmand, 320 B.R. at 920.
77 Morgan, 247 B.R. at 782.
78 Weir v. Paige (In re Weir), 296 B.R. 710, 716 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002) (“Regardless of the test used in
determining whether repayment of student loans constitutes undue hardship under § 523(a)(8), at a minimum
the court must focus on two issues: (1) the economic prospects of the debtor and (2) whether the conduct of the
debtor disqualifies the debtor from taking advantage of the exception.”).
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C. Section 523(a)(8)’s Function as a Procedural Bar to Student-Loan Debt
Relief
Student-loan debtors must contend not only with the substantive difficulties
in proving they meet the vague standard of § 523(a)(8), but they must also
overcome the difficulty presented by the procedural requirements of the
Bankruptcy Rules. Foremost among these hurdles is the necessity of an
adversary proceeding to determine dischargeability.79 Once a student-loan
creditor has established the existence of a valid claim, the debtor has the
burden to prove he or she will suffer undue hardship without discharge relief.80
To accomplish this, the debtor must file an adversary proceeding to “determine
the dischargeability of a debt.”81 Unfortunately, litigation concerning an undue
hardship discharge is, in some sense, almost antithetical to the Code’s
approach to litigation generally. As it is most likely to occur in a situation
where the debtor is in dire financial straits, such litigation threatens to encroach
upon a debtor’s fresh start.82
The Code’s approach to the protection of a debtor’s fresh start generally
discourages excess litigation during bankruptcy proceedings. Upon filing for
bankruptcy, the debtor is afforded protection through the automatic stay
provision, which prevents the debtor from facing any proceedings concerning
prebankruptcy debt, including arbitration, license revocation, and
administrative and judicial proceedings.83 Thus, from the debtor’s perspective,
this protection evidences the Code’s inherent hostility toward litigation over
claims that arose before the filing of bankruptcy.

79

FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6).
See In re Betz, 31 B.R. 565, 566 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1983); Conn. Student Loan Found. v. Keenan (In
re Keenan), 53 B.R. 913, 918 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985) (finding that defendant sustained the burden of proof in
showing undue hardship, thus allowing for the defendant’s debts to be discharged); Garneau v. N.Y. State
Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Garneau), 122 B.R. 178, 179 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that undue
hardship must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence).
81 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6).
82 The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 189 (acknowledging four categories of cases
concerning the creditor and debtor’s assessment of the nondischargeability status of a debt and finding that
litigation is most likely to occur “where the creditor believes the debt to be nondischargeable and the debtor
believes the debt to be dischargeable”).
83 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 50 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5836; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296–97. The automatic
stay is a fundamental function of the Code to protect debtors from overzealous and encroaching creditors. See
11 U.S.C. § 362; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 50; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 340.
80
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By allowing a creditor’s claim to simply be a right to payment, which is
presumptively valid in the absence of an objection, the Code proclaims its
preference for efficiency and expediency in bankruptcy.84 Furthermore, the
equality principle, which seeks to maximize a debtor’s assets through a
common pool system of treatment of creditors, discourages individual creditor
litigation as it will necessarily limit the recovery of all creditors by causing the
debtor to expend resources that would normally be distributed amongst all
creditors.85 Thus, the procedural requirements put in place by Congress seem
adverse to the Code’s general attitude toward the litigation of pre-bankruptcy
debts.86
Beyond the seeming paradox of undue hardship litigation in light of the
Code’s protective automatic stay approach, a debtor’s fresh start is also gravely
threatened by the requirement of an adversary proceeding, which places the
debtor at a significant disadvantage. First, to litigate a claim, the debtor will be
forced to expend vital resources at a time when resources are scarce.87 Next,
there is generally a power imbalance between litigants, “[a]s debtors with
student loans are likely to owe debts to large institutional creditors that are well
funded, legally sophisticated, and repeat players.”88 Finally, a debtor may
attempt to prove his or her claim pro se, which may pose an almost
insurmountable task because of the complexity of the undue hardship tests.89
Worse yet, if a debtor is more likely to succeed with the aid of a lawyer, who
will presumably only be available to those debtors with more resources, then
this system imposes the most unwarranted hardship on the debtors in the worst
financial condition.90 Thus, an adversary proceeding may place a unique
burden on the student-loan debtor. In most cases, it is a creditor who files an
adversary proceeding to have a debt deemed nondischargeable, but in the
84 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5)(A), 502(a); see also FED R. BANKR. P. 3001(f) (proscribing that a properly
filed proof of claim is prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of that claim).
85 The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 186–87.
86 See id. at 188 (putting forth the counterarguments that undue hardship litigation was the type of
litigation the Code seeks to prevent).
87 See Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 67, 124 (2006) (finding that the fresh start may be “more myth than magic bullet” and that many chapter
7 debtors continue to have significant financial trouble post-bankruptcy).
88 The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 191 (alteration in original).
89 See supra Part I.B.
90 See The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 191–92. Debtors with little to no resources, those
who really have the most sympathetic cases, may be more likely to simply not bring a claim because they fear
failure without the aid of a lawyer. Interestingly, debtors with the necessary resources to effectively litigate
their claim are thus rewarded for declaring bankruptcy with resources in the bank, so to speak, although
creditors can point to these resources as evidence that the debtor should not receive discharge. Id.
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context of student loans, it is the debtor who must initiate the proceeding to
have the debts deemed dischargeable.91 The procedural requirements of
§ 7001(6) may threaten the debtor’s chance at a fresh start and seem to offend
the general spirit of the Code toward prebankruptcy debt litigation, thereby
sending the message to debtors that they face an uphill battle in their fight to
overcome the exception to student-loan discharges.
II. THE BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE SYSTEM
Part II.A begins with an overview of the intended function of this
Comment. Next, Part II.B addresses the unique structure of the bankruptcy
appellate system, followed in Part II.C by an overview of the appellate process.
Finally, Part II.D sets out theories of why parties choose to appeal the
determination of whether a debtor has met the standard required for a studentloan discharge under the undue hardship provision.
A. The Function of an Appellate Study of Bankruptcy Decisions Concerning
§ 523(a)(8) Undue Hardship Determinations
Studying data from ten years of bankruptcy appellate cases that relate to the
undue hardship provision can hopefully provide some systematical clarity to
the application of an ambiguous standard and how well it comports with the
general goals of bankruptcy. However, the unique nature of each individual’s
bankruptcy case and of § 523(a)(8)’s conditional provision make this data
exclusive and difficult to apply to other areas of bankruptcy law. But, there is a
gap in the literature that has thus far failed to address the undue hardship
determinations. Years ago, the first empirical data was catalogued to study the
effects of the application of § 523(a)(8)’s harsh standard.92 Follow-up studies
have explored the effects of the presence of specific debtor characteristics and
other factors that have influenced decisions.93 Each of these studies, though,
has only focused on the bankruptcy courts themselves; none have addressed

91 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012) (establishing different categories of debt that, with the exception of
§ 523(a)(8), can be excepted from discharge and provide motivation only to creditors to initiate proceedings to
preserve their rights to payment).
92 See generally Undue Hardship, supra note 6.
93 See generally Pardo, supra note 6 (analyzing the effect of a medical condition in an undue hardship
proceeding); The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6 (analyzing the effects of specific demographic,
economic, and other variables in undue hardship proceedings); Iuliano, supra note 6 (analyzing the effects of
many variables, including the presence of a medical condition, age, employment, income, etc., in undue
hardship proceedings).
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the application of the undue hardship standard in the bankruptcy appellate
system. This Comment will attempt to address this next logical step in the
study of §523(a)(8) by extrapolating conclusions from the appellate data in this
study for three reasons: (1) to make practitioners aware of the prospects they
face in each appellate option in the unique structure of the bankruptcy
appellate system; (2) to provide the appellate courts with empirical data to
show the effects that have been produced by the tests they have adopted and
the attitudes and predispositions with which they approach each student-loan
debt case they receive; and (3) to address a systemic issue that the data
indicates is preventing debtors from accessing the justice that bankruptcy law
is intended to provide.
B. The Structure of the Bankruptcy Appellate System
The bankruptcy appellate structure is unique in that it is a two-tiered
system.94 Under this system, a debtor may appeal a decision from the
bankruptcy court to either the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel
(“BAP”).95 Both the district court and BAP are authorized to independently
consider appeals, as a matter of right, from “final judgments, orders and

94 7 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. § 170:04 (3d ed.
2008). The unique structure of the bankruptcy appellate process “can be traced to congressional reform efforts
during the 1970s that sought to improve the quality of the bankruptcy court while simultaneously maintaining
it in a subordinate relationship to the district court.” Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical
Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745,
1753 (2008) (footnote omitted). Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, many bankruptcy cases were delegated to
bankruptcy referees. Id. at 1754. When the Supreme Court created the rules of bankruptcy procedure in 1973
these bankruptcy referees became bankruptcy judges. Id. With the enactment of the Code in 1978, Congress
rejected the possibility of vesting bankruptcy judges with Article III status, yet gave them broad jurisdictional
powers. Id. at 1755. This choice caused disputes regarding the jurisdictional power of bankruptcy judges to
oversee non-core proceedings, which came to a head in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982). Nash & Pardo, supra, at 1755. In Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court
determined that to the extent that Article III powers had been granted to non-Article III courts (here, the
bankruptcy courts), “[s]uch a grant of jurisdiction cannot be sustained as an exercise of Congress’ power to
create adjuncts to Art. III courts.” N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 87 (alteration in original). In response,
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 established bankruptcy courts as units of the
district court and thereby created a system where a bankruptcy must be filed with a district court, who will
then likely have a standing order which refers the case to a bankruptcy judge. Nash & Pardo, supra, at 1755–
56. The bankruptcy judge is then empowered to hear and definitively rule upon any of the core proceedings of
the bankruptcy case but may only make recommendations as to non-core proceedings, which are then subject
to de novo review by the district court if any party objects to such recommendations. Id. at 1756. Final
decisions upon these core proceedings by the bankruptcy court are then subject to review by either the district
court or BAP with possible review by the court of appeals to follow. Id.
95 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)–(b)(1) (2012). Note, that an appellant may also appeal directly to the circuit court if
certain conditions are met. See id. § 158(d).
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decrees of . . . bankruptcy judges.”96 Appeals from either of these courts are
made to the appropriate circuit court of appeals,97 after which parties may seek
discretionary review by the Supreme Court.98 The first level of appeal is
unique to the bankruptcy system, and the savvy appellant must be familiar with
the difference between the two options before making the initial decision of
choosing an appellate court. The options set before the appellant are depicted
below in Figure 1:99
Figure 1:
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE STRUCTURE
Discretionary Final Review:
Supreme Court

Second-Tier
Intermediate Review:
Court of Appeals

First-Tier
Intermediate Review:
(Possibility 1)

First-Tier
Intermediate Review:
(Possibility 2)

District Court

BAP

Initial Determination:
Bankruptcy Court

96
97
98
99

Id. § 158(a)–(b)(1).
7 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 94, § 170:04 (2008).
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
Nash & Pardo, supra note 94, at 1759.
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Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1), a judicial council of each circuit has the
option to establish a BAP comprised of bankruptcy judges from that circuit,
though not all circuits have chosen to do so.100 Furthermore, a majority of
district judges in the district must vote in the affirmative to empower a BAP to
hear appeals from bankruptcy courts.101 Where they exist, BAPs are the default
forum for an appeal from the bankruptcy court,102 and the panel is comprised
of three bankruptcy judges.103
The stare decisis effects of decisions by district court and BAPs have been
an issue of contention for some time. There are four predominant theories as to
how to approach the precedential effect of these first-tier appellate decisions.
The first approach, endorsed by Coyne v. Westinghouse Credit Corp. (In re
Globe Illumination Co.), posits that because the BAPs are a creation of the
circuit courts, their decisions have the same binding authority on all
bankruptcy courts within their respective circuit as the court of appeals.104 The
second approach views both district courts and BAPs as intermediate appellate
courts separating the bankruptcy court and court of appeals, giving BAP
decisions binding precedential control over all bankruptcy courts in the circuit
and giving district courts binding precedential control over the bankruptcy
courts within their district.105 The third approach holds that both district court
and BAP decisions are binding precedent only within the district from which
the appeal arose.106 The final, and most restrictive, approach takes the position
that the district court and BAP decisions have no precedential effect on any
100 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1). To date, only five circuits (1st, 6th, 8th, 9th, and 10th) have elected to create a
BAP. Ben L. Mesches, Bankruptcy Appeals, 45 TEX. J. BUS. L. 107, 128 (2013). Furthermore, Congress has
attempted to encourage the creation of more BAPs. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (stating that “[t]he judicial
council of a circuit shall establish a bankruptcy appellate panel”).
101 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6).
102 Id. § 158(c)(1).
103 Id. § 158(b)(5) (stating that the members of the panel cannot be from the same district from which the
appeal originates).
104 Coyne v. Westinghouse Credit Corp. (In re Globe Illumination Co.), 149 B.R. 614, 621 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1993) (“The bankruptcy courts throughout the circuit certainly must be bound by a BAP decision.”). Dicta
within this case also asserted that in matters of bankruptcy, the BAP may even have superiority over the
district court, although this view was rejected by many district courts asserting that their power as an Art. III
court is not trumped by a BAP. See Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, Inc., 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1990);
Far W. Fed. Bank v. Vanasen (In re Vanasen), 81 B.R. 59, 62 (D. Or. 1987).
105 See In re Windmill Farms, Inc., 70 B.R. 618, 622 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 841
F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Proudfoot, 144 B.R. 876, 878–79 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992) (citing In re Windmill
Farms, 70 B.R. at 622); In re Gen. Associated Investors Ltd. P’ship, 150 B.R. 756, 760–61 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1993).
106 See State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Zamora (In re Silverman), 616 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1679 (2011); In re Warren, 91 B.R. 930 (Bankr. D. Or. 1988).
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court concerning these matters.107 These different approaches are further
evidence of the complexity of the bankruptcy system and the need for a
practitioner to be well versed in and aware of the local practices in his or her
district.
With the general bankruptcy appellate structure and the precedential nature
of both first-tier appellate options in mind, the next important step for an
appellant is to consider both the qualitative and quantitative factors that should
affect an appellant’s choice at the first-tier appellate level. The results of a
2008 empirical study by Professors Jonathan Nash and Rafael Pardo (the
“Nash/Pardo study”) of three years of bankruptcy appellate opinions from both
the first- and second-tier appellate levels suggest that: (1) “courts of appeals
are more likely to uphold upon review the conclusions of BAPs than district
courts” and (2) “BAP decisions are . . . cited more frequently . . . than are
district court decisions.”108
Professors Nash and Pardo posited that BAP decisions have a higher level
of quality based on two primary observations: (1) objective characteristics of
quality appellate review and (2) opinion affirmance and citation rates.109 The
results of their study confirmed that the BAP may indeed provide higher
quality appellate review than district courts.110 The Nash/Pardo study based
this conclusion on both a comparison of the traditional factors that might
indicate quality appellate review and the statistical results from three years of
bankruptcy decisions.111
Recognizing the difficulty in addressing every possible factor that might
contribute to quality appellate review, Pardo and Nash stated that “the
academic literature does suggest several attributes that will tend to contribute
to better review,”112 and they are as follows: (1) “panels of judges;” (2)
“expertise of the appellate decisionmaking body in the subject matter of the
appeals it hears;” (3) “general ‘lawfinding ability;’” (4) “the extent to which an

107 See In re Rheuban 128 B.R. 551 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991). The reasoning behind such a view is that the
BAP and district court are on the same level and thus one does not control the other, and because bankruptcy
courts are units of the district courts and district court decisions do not bind other district court judges, the
bankruptcy courts are not controlled by either appellate court. See Rinard v. Positive Invs., Inc. (In re Rinard),
451 B.R. 12, 21 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011).
108 Nash & Pardo, supra note 94, at 1747.
109 Id. at 1769–74.
110 See id. at 1775 n.112.
111 Id. at 1791.
112 Id. at 1748.
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appellate court conforms to traditional appellate hierarchy;” and (5) “judicial
independence.”113
The Nash/Pardo study concluded that BAPs have more of the
abovementioned features of quality appellate review than do district courts.114
First, BAPs decide cases in three-judge panels as opposed to a single district
court judge deciding a case alone, giving BAPs the inherent advantage of
reviewing a case with three judges instead of one.115 Second, because BAP
judges are, “by virtue of their appointment as bankruptcy judges,” presumably
experts in bankruptcy law, they are better suited to resolve issues in core
bankruptcy proceedings than their district court counterparts.116 With regard to
the third factor—general lawfinding ability—the Nash/Pardo study concluded
that neither court has any innate advantage.117 Fourth, the study found BAPs
conform more to the traditional notion of appellate review than do district
courts.118 Finally, the study concluded that, concerning the factor of judicial
independence, district court judges have an advantage over BAPs.119 In
reflection, the BAPs clearly possess more of the academically suggested
features of quality appellate review than do their district court counterparts.
The Nash/Pardo study also found that BAPs have a higher perceived level
of quality appellate review based on two broad categories of their findings

113

Id. at 1748–52 (footnotes omitted). The Nash/Pardo study can be consulted for more information
concerning the rationale of why these factors are considered to be indicators of quality appellate review.
114 Id. at 1759.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 1759–60.
117 Id. at 1760.
118 Id. at 1761–62 (footnote omitted) (stating that BAP “rulings are generally seen to be binding on future
bankruptcy appellate panels drawn from the same circuit . . . . In contrast, one district judge is generally not
bound to follow the ruling of another district judge . . . .”).
119 Id. at 1765. However, the Nash/Pardo study went on to establish that this advantage held by district
court judges was slim at best. On the one hand, district court judges are Article III judges, appointed with life
tenure and a guarantee of nonreduction in salary. Id. On the other hand, bankruptcy judges receive neither of
these benefits as they are not Article III judges. Id. But, Professors Nash and Pardo go on to demonstrate that
this perceived inequality is only marginal. Id. First, although bankruptcy judges only serve a fourteen-year
term, their appointments can be and often are renewed; few bankruptcy judges leave for lack of reappointment.
Id. at 1765–66. Second, the removal process for bankruptcy judges is, in reality, very similar to that of Article
III judges and has not produced results that would likely prevent a bankruptcy judge from acting
independently. Id. at 1766–67. Third, because the bankruptcy judges’ salaries have been pegged at 92% of the
salary of a district court judge since 1987, the bankruptcy judges enjoy a substantially similar fixed
compensation as a district court judge. Id. at 1767. Finally, Professors Nash and Pardo surmise that, given the
appointment process of bankruptcy judges, they “may be better situated than district judges to resist the
political influence that would threaten to compromise an independent judiciary.” Id.
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related to affirmances and citations.120 Findings in both of these categories
sought to test the “correctness” of decisions originating from the BAP and the
district courts.121 Confirming the authors’ hypotheses, the data indicated that
BAP decisions were more often affirmed and positively cited, which “tends to
validate theoreticians’ claims about the ideal attributes of appellate review.”122
This Comment will seek to build on these results and provide further
considerations of the Nash/Pardo findings in light of the study’s results.
C. The Bankruptcy Appellate Process
The unique structure of the bankruptcy appellate process can be a difficult
hurdle for the student-loan debtor to overcome, but the procedural
requirements of this process also present challenges for a debtor. At the
inception of a case, original bankruptcy jurisdiction is vested in the U.S.
district courts,123 which may create standing orders to refer bankruptcy cases to
bankruptcy judges within the district.124 These bankruptcy judges are Article I
judges appointed by the court of appeals125 and “may hear and determine all
cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in
a case under title 11.”126 As such, these judges are empowered to make
“determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts.”127 Bankruptcy
courts have the statutory authority to rule definitively on these proceedings,
subject to review by an appellate court.128 To obtain a ruling on the
dischargeability of a student-loan debt, a debtor must initiate an adversary
proceeding at this initial stage of the bankruptcy process by filing a
complaint.129
From the final judgment of a bankruptcy court regarding the
dischargeability of a debt, an appellant may appeal to either the district court or
the BAP.130 Although the BAP, where one has been established, is the default

120

Id. at 1804–05.
Id. at 1770.
122 Id. at 1807.
123 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)–(b) (2012).
124 Id. § 157(a).
125 Id. § 152(a)(1).
126 Id. § 157(b)(1).
127 Id. § 157(b)(2)(I).
128 Id. § 157(b)(1).
129 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6), 7003.
130 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), (b)(1) (authorizing the creation of the BAP and empowering it to hear appeals with
consent of the parties).
121
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appellate option from a bankruptcy court, an appellant or any other party may
elect to have the appeal heard by the district court.131 From the final ruling of
the BAP or district court, a party may appeal to the appropriate court of
appeal.132
The procedural requirements for an appeal are rigorous for any debtor, but
they can be especially difficult for a pro se debtor.133 An appeal from the final
judgment, order, or decree of the bankruptcy court must be filed with the clerk
within fourteen days of entry of the ruling.134 Failure to do so will result in the
dismissal of the appeal.135 In addition, within the fourteen day window the
appellant must file “a designation of the items to be included in the record on
appeal and a statement of the issues to be presented.”136 This record includes
the “items so designated by the parties, the notice of appeal, the judgment,
order, or decree appealed from, and any opinion, findings of fact, and
conclusions of law of the court,” and, if needed, “a written request for the
transcript,” all of which the appellant bears the costs of providing.137
Having jumped through the procedural hoops to initiate an appeal, a debtorappellant faces a difficult task to overturn a bankruptcy court’s findings of fact.
An appellate court reviews the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact under a
clearly erroneous standard.138 Furthermore, “where there are two permissible
131 Id. § 158(c)(1) (allowing for an election of the district court as long as the party does so within 30 days
of notice of appeal). The district court has jurisdiction to hear such appeals under § 158(a).
132 Id. § 158(d)(1).
133 See Lark v. Bd. of Trs. (In re Lark), No. CC-09-1239, 2010 WL 6451889, at *4 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Feb.
4, 2010) (dismissing debtor’s case because she failed to provide a transcript for review).
134 FED. R. BANKR. P. 8001(f)(3)(D).
135 Id. 8001(a) (“An appellant’s failure to take any step other than timely filing a notice of appeal does not
affect the validity of the appeal . . . .”) (emphasis added). Put another way, while other errors in perfecting
one’s appeal, such as an untimely designation of the record, do not affect the appeal’s validity, failure to timely
file the notice of appeal does affect the appeal’s validity.
136 Id. 8006.
137 Id. It should be noted from the outset that these requirements can be difficult for a pro se debtor who is
unfamiliar with not only the law in general, but the specific practices of the bankruptcy appellate process. In
just the cases reviewed for this Comment’s study, many were found to be dismissed because of a procedural
error of the debtor-appellant. See Lark, 2010 WL 6451889, at *6 (dismissing debtor’s case because she failed
to provide a transcript for review); Hough v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Hough), 128 F. App’x
369 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding the case unable to be examined because pro se debtor failed to provide
transcripts); Looper v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., No. 3:07-cv-306, 2008 WL 2965887, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. July
30, 2008) (dismissing debtor’s case for failure to file a motion to extend the time to file a brief within the
fourteen day timeframe).
138 Rifino v. United States (In re Rifino), 245 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing United Student Aid
Funds (In re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998)); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re
Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 398 (4th Cir. 2005).
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views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous.”139 Applying this lenient standard, appellate judges often do not
overturn factual findings by the bankruptcy court, even if they would have
chosen differently.140 The debtor-appellant then must show that the bankruptcy
court somehow erred in the calculation of income, expenses, or any other
factual bases that might be used to determine whether the debtor met the
standard required for a discharge under the undue hardship provision.141
Because the majority of appellate cases do not involve a challenge to the
lower court’s factual findings,142 the focus at the appellate level is often on the
question of whether the debtor satisfied the applicable test to prove that he or
she would have an undue hardship without a discharge. Both appellate tiers in
the bankruptcy system “review directly the bankruptcy court’s decision.”143
Because the determination of whether the facts of a particular debtor’s case
meet the requisite standard to prove undue hardship involves applying facts to
legal standards, the standard of review, as shown below, must be clearly
defined to afford an effective appellate procedure:
Whether a debtor has met the undue hardship standard is a legal
conclusion that is based on the debtor’s individual factual
circumstances. It is thus a mixed question of law and fact. As we
have explained in a related context, these types of questions are
reviewed “under a hybrid standard, applying to the factual portion of
each inquiry the same standard applied to questions of pure fact and
examining de novo the legal conclusions derived from those
facts.” . . . We therefore review de novo the determination of whether

139 Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Birrane (In re Birrane), 287 B.R. 490, 494 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2002) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).
140 See Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. McDay, No. Civ.A.AW 04 2630, 2005 WL 5327774, at *3
(D. Md. Feb. 9, 2005) (noting that the bankruptcy court, as the trial court, is in the best position to judge the
credibility of those who testify at the trial). Notably, in the majority of the cases analyzed for this Comment’s
study, either the parties did not contest the bankruptcy court’s factual findings or the appellate court quickly
stated that the factual findings of the bankruptcy court were not clearly erroneous and thus accepted. See infra
Part III.A.
141 See Walker v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Walker), 650 F.3d 1227, 1230 (8th Cir. 2011) (“We
will not upset those findings of fact unless, after reviewing the entire record, we are left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”).
142 Only 32% of cases in this Comment’s study contained issues of fact. More often than not, the parties
did not contest the underlying court’s factual findings and the court then simply accepted the lower court’s
findings of facts. See infra Part III.A.
143 Frushour, 433 F.3d at 398 (stating that the court of appeals reviews directly). As well, both the BAP
and district court review the bankruptcy court’s decision directly because they are the first appellate level.
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a debtor has met the undue hardship standard, and we review the
144
factual underpinnings of that legal conclusion for clear error.

The de novo review applied by an appellate court is problematic, though, for
an appellant because it places the appellate judges in the same positions as the
bankruptcy judge, equally prone to the inherent subjectivity and inconsistency
seen in the lower court.145 Because appellate judges review the determination
de novo, they might apply a harsher standard to the facts of the case simply
because they were not present at the bankruptcy trial.146 In addition, where the
debtor may feel that they have a decent chance of relief at the appellate level
because the case was close at the bankruptcy court level, in reality, appellate
courts often cite to congressional intent to make student-loan discharge
difficult, to presumptive nondischargeability, and to negative student-loan
debtor stereotypes to justify a strict approach to an undue hardship
determination.147 In sum, debtors face many of the same difficulties in
appellate review that they first confronted at the bankruptcy court level.
D. Why Appeal?
In light of the difficulties noted above, debtors may be hesitant to appeal
decisions of the bankruptcy courts. Theoretically, one might imagine four
scenarios in which an appeal may be made based on whether the debtor or
creditor is willing to appeal:

Debtor not willing to
appeal
Debtor willing to
appeal

Creditor not willing to
appeal

Creditor willing to
appeal

No appeal occurs

Appeal occurs

Appeal occurs

Appeal occurs

Of course, where neither the creditor nor the debtor believes they have a good
case, neither party will appeal, thus accepting the court’s determination.

144

Id. at 398–99 (citations omitted).
See discussion supra Part I.B.
146 See generally Tirch v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Tirch), 409 F.3d 677, 681 (6th Cir.
2005) (declining to affirm a discharge of student-loan debt based partly on the determination that testimony
from the debtor at trial as to her medical condition, without supporting documentation or testimony by doctors,
was insufficient to satisfy the standard).
147 See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 780, 782 (8th Cir. 2009); Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1306 (10th Cir. 2005).
145
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However, assuming that a debtor does not want to appeal because they have
won in the bankruptcy court, a creditor may appeal for the obvious reason that
they believe they should have won in the lower court. Evidence from the cases
used in this Comment’s study suggests another possible reason the creditor
may appeal. In some of the first tier cases, repeat players, like Educational
Credit Management Corp., were observed focusing primarily on trying to get
the appellate court to create per se rules, creating a narrower exception for
debtors by which they might gain a student-loan discharge.148 Similarly, when
the creditor does not want to appeal but the debtor does, it is likely the result
that the creditor won in the bankruptcy court, but the debtor believes they have
a strong case on which to appeal. Evidence of this can be seen in some of the
cases from this Comment’s study where a debtor with a medical condition
appealed an unfavorable decision at the bankruptcy court level.149
However, if the debtor does have a strong case, why might the creditor not
choose to simply settle? The likely explanation is that the creditor feels, having
already won in the bankruptcy court, that their side is the stronger of the two,
but, once again, they may simply move forward with an appeal because of
desire to create per se rules with binding precedential authority. Finally, there
is the situation where both sides might be willing to appeal, and indeed both
sides may cross-appeal. As an appeal requires further financial outlay for
already cash-strapped debtors, they will likely only be willing to appeal if they
believe they have a strong overall case with the best chance of winning on
appeal. Creditors, as repeat players, have significantly more financial resources

148 See Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 363–64 (6th Cir. 2007)
(showing ECMC pushing for a per se rule that not pursuing an Income Contingent Repayment Plan must mean
that the debtor fails the good faith prong); Frushour, 433 F.3d at 400 (showing ECMC asking for per se rule
that have Internet and cable connections requires the conclusions that a debtor is maintaining more than a
minimal standard of living); Polleys, 356 F.3d at 1311 (showing ECMC pushing for per se rule that medical
disability is required in order to satisfy the future inability prong); Saxman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re
Saxman), 325 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2003) (showing ECMC pushing for per se rule that partial discharge through
use of 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) is unacceptable); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Smith, No. H-11-57, 2011 WL
4625397 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2011) (showing ECMC pushing for per se rule that a low paying job alone is not
enough to satisfy the requirements of the future inability prong); McLaney v. Ky. Higher Educ. Assistance
Auth. (In re McLaney), 375 B.R. 666 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (showing ECMC pushing for a per se rule that tithing
is not an allowable expense).
149 Prevailing studies suggest that a medical condition significantly increases the chances of satisfying the
undue hardship standard, and thus those with medical conditions that lost in the initial case might think they
have a greater chance to succeed on appeal; see Pardo, supra note 6, at 511; Roe v. Coll. Access Network (In
re Roe), 295 F. App’x 927 (10th Cir. 2008); Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash), 446 F.3d 188
(1st Cir. 2006); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Barrett (In re Barrett), 337 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 6th 2006); State
Univ. N.Y.-Student Loan Serv. Ctr. v. Menezes, 352 B.R. 8 (D. Mass. 2006).
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and are invested in the process as a whole with a view that goes beyond the
case-at-hand.150
Given the existence of an affirmance bias in appellate courts,151 the reason
must indeed be strong for the creditor or debtor to choose to appeal. However,
the debtor may proceed simply because they have little to lose. Already in the
bankruptcy process, the debtor may just hope for a better result from the de
novo review of the bankruptcy court’s undue hardship determination.152 The
creditor, for similar reasons, may also seek to take advantage of the de novo
review standard to overturn a bankruptcy court decision that was unfavorable
to them. In addition, creditors, as repeat players, may know of the appellate
courts’ reputation for strict review of the undue hardship determination153 and
may also proceed in an attempt to create per se rules that would aid them in
future cases.
III. THE APPELLATE STUDY
In this Part, this Comment presents the results from the study performed.
This Part will begin first with a discussion of the methodology implemented in
the selection of the opinions chosen for analysis in this study. Then, the
findings from data gleaned from those opinions will be presented to show the
harsh reality that debtors face in the appellate system.
A. Selection Criteria and Methodology
Before presenting the findings of this study, it is important to explain the
methodology used to select the opinions that made up the group from which
the data for this study was obtained. The purpose of this study was to survey
the entire appellate landscape as it related to review of bankruptcy court
determinations of whether a debtor had satisfied the undue hardship
requirement of § 523(a)(8). Thus, the study attempted to encompass opinions
from every circuit and as many districts as possible. This was done in an
attempt to provide data that would be representative of judicial doctrine
150 This means they may make choices that, though they may not prove fruitful in this particular case, may
result in favorable rules they can use in later cases in which they know they will take part.
151 Nash & Pardo, supra note 94, at 960 (noting that “appellate review standards create an affirmance
bias”) (citing FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 48–49 (2007)).
152 See Frushour, 433 F.3d at 398–99 (explaining the appellate review de novo standard).
153 See Rifino v. United States (In re Rifino), 245 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001); McLaney, 375 B.R. at
673; Geyer v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Geyer), 344 B.R. 129, 131 (S.D. Cal. 2006); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v.
DeGroot, 339 B.R. 201, 206 (D. Or. 2006).
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developed across the country.154 As such, this data is a starting point for future
studies to better inform practitioners and judges in specific circuits and judicial
districts.
In light of these goals, the study began with a search of Westlaw’s FBKRCS database155 with the following terms and connectors: 523(A)(8) &
PR(“COURT OF APPEALS” “BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL”
“DISTRICT COURT”) & da(aft 12/31/2001 & bef 01/01/2012). This restricted
the results to those opinions issued by courts of appeals, BAPs, and district
courts who used the phrase “523(a)(8)” within their opinion, and whose
opinions were issued in a ten year date range beginning on January 1, 2002 and
ending on December 31, 2011. Theoretically, this narrowed the study’s focus
to appellate opinions that addressed the provisions of § 523(a)(8), although it is
important to note that an opinion that dealt with these provision but did not cite
to the Code would have fallen by the wayside. However, it is unlikely that
many opinions of this nature exist. This initial search produced 289 results, all
of which were studied regardless of whether the decisions had been published
in the Federal Reporter, Federal Appendix, or the Bankruptcy Reporter. The
rationale for including these unpublished results was that they still had
significant value as they documented the appellate court decision-making
process and yielded valuable data to form a more well-rounded view of the
average debtor on appeal. After pouring through each of these opinions and
coding for the variables used in the study, the result yielded 144 opinions that
dealt directly with an undue hardship determination on appeal, while the
remaining 145 opinions merely cited to § 523(a)(8) for other purposes.
The opinions that dealt directly with an undue hardship determination
represented a fair cross-section of judicial circuits as illustrated in Bar Charts 1
and 2 below:

154 It is important to note that by studying only judicial opinions, this study fails to encompass the many
cases that are settled or disposed of by other means.
155 Westlaw is a commercial electronic database that can be accessed via internet at http://www.westlaw.
com.
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These charts reflect the representative nature of this study, which allows the
following findings to have a wider degree of applicability across the United
States.
Each of these opinions was coded for key variables to provide data for
analysis. Many of these variables have been previously identified as influential
on the decision-making processes for judges.156 These variables included: (1)
whether the debtor was an appellant; (2) whether there was an issue of law or
fact in the case; (3) the debtor’s filing status as joint or individual; (4) whether
the debtor was pro se; (5) the debtor’s household income and expenses; (6) the
debtor’s employment status; (7) whether the debtor or a dependent had a
medical condition; (8) the debtor’s age; (9) the amount of debt at stake in the
case; (10) the creditor’s identity; and (11) the basis of the appellate court’s
decision. These variables, combined with key identification information,157
provide the data necessary to make some key findings as to how the debtor
fares in the appellate arena.
B. The Findings from a Study of Undue Hardship Appellate Court
Determinations
Appellate courts applying the undue hardship provision have substantially
ruled against discharge of student-loan debt. Theoretically, the provision in
§ 523(a)(8) allows the honest but unfortunate debtor the opportunity to
discharge onerous student-loan debt. The Brunner court presumably had this
goal in mind when it formally adopted the test to determine dischargeability.158
“Many subsequent courts employing the Brunner analysis, however, appear to
have constrained the three Brunner requirements to deny discharge under even
the most dire circumstances.”159 This raises the question of what message the
appellate courts are sending concerning the availability of student-loan debt
discharge.

156 See Undue Hardship, supra note 6; Pardo, supra note 6; Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The
Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6; Iuliano, supra note 6.
157 This simply includes the case name, appellate court identification, citation, location, and disposition of
the case.
158 Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2nd Cir. 1987) (per
curiam).
159 Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1308 (10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) (noting
that Congress clearly enacted § 523(a)(8) only in an attempt to curb the abuse of the bankruptcy system by
these stereotypical debtors with lots of earning potential but high debts they want to get rid of).
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The primary focus of this Comment is to ascertain, based on empirical data,
the message being sent from the appellate opinions for a student-loan debtor,
especially as it relates to concerns about access to justice. The quote above
brings to the forefront this concern about student-loan debtors and the
difficulties they face trying to access the protection that the bankruptcy system
is intended to provide. Figure 1 illustrates this key concern by showing the
lopsided results in favor of the creditor at the appellate level:

Appellant
Creditor
Debtor
Total

Figure 1: Success On Appeal by Appellant Type
Success on Appeal
Total
No
Yes
41
48
89
46.07%
53.93%
100.00%
43
10
53
81.13%
18.87%
100.00%
84
58
142
59.15%
40.85%
100.00%
Pearson chi2 (1) = 16.9039
Pr. = 0.0001

Applying a chi-squared test160 with one degree of freedom to compare whether
there is a correlation between the appellant and their success on appeal, the
results revealed a statistically significant finding161 that the student-loan debtor
often failed to achieve success. Absent a relationship between the appellant
and their success on appeal, one would expect to see a debtor-appellant
succeed in approximately 40.85% of the cases and fail in 59.15% of the cases.
The data reveals that debtors actually succeed in approximately 18.87% of
cases and fail in 81.13% of cases. This shocking deviation from the expected
results shows that debtors face substantial challenges on appeal.
Seeing that debtors are often unsuccessful in appealing their cases, the
question then becomes “why are they unsuccessful?”162 A major indicator that
appellate courts were engaging in an overly harsh view to start is the fact that
many cases began their analysis by noting that student loans are

160

See generally ALAN AGRESTI, CATEGORICAL DATA ANALYSIS (1990).
Here, there was less than a 0.0001 probability that random chance alone would have yielded a
difference as large as that witnessed between the observed and expected values. It is generally accepted that
where the probability is less than .05, or 5%, the finding is statistically significant and thus indicates that there
is a correlative relationship between the two variables.
162 To fully answer this would require expositions of every case in the study, but the purpose of this study
was to see if there were any indicators in the empirical data that could answer this question.
161
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“presumptively nondischargeable.”163 But, using the empirical data, this study
attempted to ascertain whether any single factor gave the debtor a better
chance on appeal. To accomplish this, the study considered the effects of: (1)
debtor representation; (2) the presence of a medical condition; (3) other
variables related to household characteristics; (4) geographic considerations;
(5) repeat, institutional creditors; and (6) district v. BAP courts. This
Subsection will discuss each of these in turn.
1. Debtor Representation
The first consideration was whether debtors were represented by counsel.
Hoping to find a correlation between a debtor’s representation and success on
appeal, the data was analyzed using chi squared tests. Figures 2 and 3 show the
results when the debtor proceeded pro se or represented, respectively:

Appellant
Creditor
Debtor
Total

Appellant
Creditor
Debtor
Total

Figure 2: Pro Se Debtor Success On Appeal
Success on Appeal
No
Yes
34
39
46.58%
53.42%
22
6
78.57%
21.43%
56
45
55.45%
44.55%
Pearson chi2 (1) = 8.3868
Pr. = 0.004
Figure 3: Represented Debtor Success On Appeal
Success on Appeal
No
Yes
6
7
46.15%
53.85%
21
4
84.00%
16.00%
27
11
71.05%
28.95%
Pearson chi2 (1) = 5.9560
Pr. = 0.015

Total
73
100.00%
28
100.00%
101
100.00%

Total
13
100.00%
25
100.00%
38
100.00%

163 See Rifino v. United States (In re Rifino), 245 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001); McLaney v. Ky.
Higher Educ. Assistance Authority (In re McLaney), 375 B.R. 666, 673 (M.D. Ala. 2007); Educ. Credit Mgmt.
Corp. v. DeGroot, 339 B.R. 201, 206 (D. Or. 2006); Geyer v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Geyer), 344 B.R. 129, 131
(S.D. Cal. 2006).
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These charts show a statistically significant correlation between the appellant
and whether the debtor was pro se or represented. Interestingly, the debtor had
substantially more overall success, 39.60% compared to 26.32%,164 when he or
she was pro se. However, the debtor had only marginally better success as a
pro se litigant when the appellant was the debtor, 21.43% compared to 16.00%.
There are two possible explanations for these findings. First, in cases where
the debtor was represented, the court might have more carefully reviewed the
debtor’s ability to pay because the debtor had the money to pay for counsel.
And second, when the pro se debtor was the appellant, they were much more
likely to have a graduate-level degree,165 which might indicate better earning
potential. This earning potential often affected the judge’s perception of
whether a particular hardship was likely to endure and, therefore, whether the
debtor would fail under the second Brunner prong, which could explain why
the findings between pro se and represented debtor-appellants were so similar.
2. Medical Condition
Studies have indicated that the presence of a medical condition plays a
large role in a bankruptcy court’s dischargeability finding.166 Theorizing that a
medical condition might also play prominently in appellate courts, the above
tests were duplicated to see if the presence of a medical condition indicated a
higher chance of success for the debtor. Figures 4167 and 5 show this analysis:
Figure 4: Success Rate With No Medical Condition Present
Success on Appeal
Total
Appellant
No
Yes
17
33
50
Creditor
34.00%
66.00%
100.00%
29
6
35
Debtor
82.86%
17.14%
100.00%
46
39
85
Total
54.12%
45.88%
100.00%
Pearson chi2 (1) = 19.7920
Pr. = 0.0001

164 Total success rate = (number of cases appealed by creditors that they lost + number of cases appealed
by debtors that they won) / total number of cases observed.
165 Many times a law degree.
166 Pardo, supra note 6, at 509–12 (finding in a study of a decade of bankruptcy decisions that the debtor’s
health played the largest role, even eclipsing a debtor’s monthly household income and expenses, in a
bankruptcy court’s determination of undue hardship).
167 Analysis includes cases that did not mention the debtor or the health of the debtor’s depenedent.
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In the absence of a relationship between debtors with no medical condition and
their success on appeal, one would expect to see the debtor-appellant to
succeed in approximately 45.88% of the cases. The data reveals that debtors
with no medical condition succeed in only 17.14% of cases where they are the
appellant. Analysis pursuant to a chi-square test with one degree of freedom
indicates that there is less than a 0.0001 probability that random chance alone
would have yielded a difference as large as that witnessed between the
observed and expected values. Debtors with no medical condition also had less
success when the creditor appealed compared to the overall results when a
creditor appealed in Figure 1.168
Figure 5: Success Rate With Medical Condition Present
Success on Appeal
Total
Appellant
No
Yes
24
15
39
Creditor
61.54%
38.46%
100.00%
14
4
18
Debtor
77.78%
22.22%
100.00%
38
19
57
Total
66.67%
33.33%
100.00%
Pearson chi2 (1) = 1.4615
Pr. = 0.227

While the results of Figure 5 did not reveal a statistically significant
relationship between the appellant and success rate when the debtor had a
medical condition, a comparison of these results with other data reveal a
noteworthy finding. In Figure 1, the results showed that when debtors appealed
they succeeded in 18.87% of cases, and when creditors appealed, they
succeeded in 53.93% of cases. As well, in Figure 4, the results showed that
when debtors have no medical condition, they succeed in only 17.14% of
cases, whereas when creditors appealed, they succeeded in 66.00% of cases. In
Figure 5, though, when debtors have a medical condition, they succeeded in
22.22% of cases in which they were the appellant, and creditors succeeded in
only 38.46% of cases in which they were the appellant.
These results indicate that, while the debtor is not guaranteed to succeed,
the presence of a medical condition seemed to level the playing field. In this
situation, creditors lose the substantial advantage they hold in most other

168 34.00% success with no medical condition compared to the overall debtor success rate when creditors
appeal, 46.07%.
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circumstances.169 Furthermore, there is evidence from the cases studied that
suggests that some debtors with medical conditions could have succeeded with
relatively small changes in their approach. For example, some debtors with
medical conditions failed on appeal because the only evidence of their
condition and its effect was their own testimony, something that could have
been easily remedied by the production of supportive documentation by
doctors.170
3. Household Characteristics
Theorizing that household characteristics might provide explanation for the
negative student-loan debtor appellate results, this study focused on income,
expenses, and average debt as a possible predictor of appellate outcomes.
However, using summary statistics and logistic regressions, the data showed
there was no statistically significant relationship between any of these
variables and success on appeal.171 The fact that there was no statistically
significant relationship is important in and of itself in that it shows that debtors
across the spectrum received relatively consistent treatment. This is notable
because it reveals that this area of bankruptcy law has attained consistency in
one aspect—its equally harsh treatment of student-loan debtors, no matter their
financial status.
4. Geography
Next, the study catalogued and analyzed geographical information to see if
there was any correlation between where the debtor’s case originated and
success on appeal. Tables A16–26 in the Appendix show the results of
applying two different bivariate statistical tests172 to assess the debtor’s success
rate by circuit. Though debtors seemed to fare better in some circuits than in

169

In each situation, the observed results were much closer to the expected values.
These debtors only provided prognoses of the outlook of their condition based on their own testimony
and did not produce medical experts, or doctors, to testify on their behalf as to the prospects of their conditions
going forward. See Roe v. Coll. Access Network (In re Roe), 295 F. App’x 927 (10th Cir. 2008); Nash v.
Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash), 446 F.3d 188 (1st Cir. 2006); State Univ. N.Y.-Student Loan Serv.
Ctr. v. Menezes, 352 B.R. 8 (D. Mass. 2006); Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett), 337 B.R.
896 (6th B.A.P. 2006).
171 See infra Appendix, Tables A1–15.
172 Fischer’s exact and chi squared tests. See generally AGRESTI, supra note 160. These tests are
performing the same analysis as originally shown in Figure 1 for overall success rates on appeal.
170
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others,173 none of the above tests revealed any statistical significance to the
success rate findings, thus indicating that geography is not necessarily
important in determining whether or not the debtor will find success. In sum,
the student-loan debtor—no matter his or her income expenses, or location—
faces a system that consistently rules in favor of the creditor more often and is
more willing to overturn decisions favorable to the debtor.
5. Institutional Creditors
The study next sought to determine the effect of key repeat creditors and
how their presence in a case affected the debtor’s prospects on appeal. An
analysis of the creditors in each case with full dispositions174 revealed two
standouts: Educational Credit Management Corporation (“ECMC”),175 who
made up 67.61% of the cases, and the U.S. Department of Education
(“USDOE”), who comprised 11.27% of the cases. Figures 6 and 7 show the
effect of the presence of ECMC in a case:

Appellee
Other
Creditor

ECMC

Total

Figure 6: Appeals by Debtors
Success on Appeal
No
Yes
20
2
90.91%
9.09%

22
100.00%

23
74.19%

31
100.00%

43
81.13%
Fisher’s exact = 0.166

8
25.81%

Total

10
53
18.87%
100.00%
1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.118

173 It is noteworthy that in the 8th Circuit, which applies the more lenient totality of circumstances test,
debtors in the cases studied actually performed terribly when they were the appellant. See infra Appendix,
Table A23 (showing that debtors succeeded in 0.00% of cases). However, when the creditor was the appellant,
the debtor succeeded in 71.43% of cases studied, possibly indicating that under the totality of the
circumstances test, courts may be more likely to uphold decisions that favor the debtor. Id.
174 There are a total of 142 cases where there is either a “full affirm” or “no affirm” disposition.
175 “ECMC is a national guaranty agency, a national student loan bankruptcy servicer, and a contractor for
the U.S. Department of Education, providing collection services and document management services.” Educ.
Credit Mgmt. Corp., ECMC–FAQ–General, ECMC, http://www.ecmc.org/details/faqGeneral.html#question3.
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Figure 7: Appeals by Creditors
Success on Appeal
No
Yes
13
11
54.17%
45.83%

24
100.00%

28
43.08%

37
56.92%

65
100.00%

48
53.93%
Pr = 0.352

89
100.00%

41
46.07%
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.8676

Total

The above chi squared and Fisher’s exact tests reveal that whether in debtor
appeals or creditor appeals, ECMC’s success rate is not statistically
significantly different than the success rates of other creditors. Based on its
experience as a significant repeat player, I expected to see ECMC’s
performance to be statistically significantly better than other creditors, but the
results above show that while ECMC fared better than other creditors when the
creditor in a case was the appellant, the difference in performance had no
statistical significance.
Figures 8 and 9 reflect the application of a Fisher’s exact test to determine
the effects when the USDOE was the creditor in a case:

Appellee
Other
Creditor

Figure 8: Appeals by Debtors
Success on Appeal
No
Yes
36
8
81.82%
18.18%

44
100.00%

USDOE

7
77.78%

9
100.00%

Total

43
81.13%
Fisher’s exact = 1.000

2
22.22%

Total

10
53
18.87%
100.00%
1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.546
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Figure 9: Appeals by Creditors
Success on Appeal
No
Yes
35
47
42.68%
57.32%

82
100.00%

6
85.71%

7
100.00%

41
46.07%
Fisher’s exact = 0.045

1
14.29%

Total

48
89
53.93%
100.00%
1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.546

The above Fisher’s exact tests reveal that, in debtor appeals, although the
debtor succeeds more often against the USDOE than other creditors, the result
is not statistically significant. On the other hand, in creditor appeals, other
creditors succeed more often than the USDOE (57.3% compared to 14.29%),
and the difference is statistically significant. Thus, when the USDOE appeals,
the debtor is likely to fare better than when another creditor appeals. As noted
in Figure 9, the USDOE was the appellant in only seven cases during the tenyear period covered in this study. If this small number is indicative of the
general role of the USDOE in student-loan discharge cases, it would seem that,
with less experience, the USDOE would be likely to fare worse in litigation
when compared to private entities. Put another way, the USDOE’s poor
performance when it appeals might be the product of an inferior ability to
assess appellate opportunities relative to other creditors who may be more
familiar with the system or have other driving incentives.176 Of course, this
sample of seven cases is relatively small and begs the question of whether the
statistically significant relationship has substantive significance. While this
question is beyond the scope of this Comment, this area would appear to be
fertile ground for future research.

176

For example, consider that a major subset of the eighty-two creditor appeals in the “Other Creditor”
row in Figure 9 involved ECMC. See supra Figure 9. More specifically, ECMC was involved in sixty-five of
the eighty-nine creditor appeals, and ECMC prevailed in approximately 57% of those appeals. See supra
Figure 7. Thus, the statistically significant result in Figure 9—that is, that other creditors fare better than the
USDOE in creditor appeals—possibly suggests that repeat players are more likely to succeed than non-repeat
players.
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6. District Court v. BAP
Finally, the last major focus of the study is to compare the success rates of
student-loan debtors in the District Courts and BAPs. Based on the conclusions
of the Nash/Pardo study,177 I hypothesized that because the BAPs are courts
that deal specifically with bankruptcy cases178 and District Courts only deal
sporadically with bankruptcy cases,179 debtors will more likely be on a level
playing field in BAPs. Two reasons suggest this outcome. First, judges on the
BAPs have repeated exposure to the common players, like ECMC, in studentloan debt discharge proceedings. This familiarity allows these judges to be
more sensitive to ECMC’s and others’ litigation techniques. Essentially, their
familiarity with common creditor tactics helps them to more effectively hear
the case without being swayed by extra-legal factors. Second, because judges
on BAPs are bankruptcy court judges themselves, they have greater experience
applying the undue hardship provision firsthand. Therefore, because the
playing field is more level in the BAP, the likely result is that BAPs will
produce results more favorable to the debtor than the results observed in the
overall success on appeal data from Figure 1. Figures 10 and 11 show the
different success rates of the debtor in both the District Courts and BAPs:

Appellant
Creditor
Debtor
Total

177
178

Figure 10: Success on Appeal in the District Courts
Success on Appeal
Total
No
Yes
20
27
47
42.55%
57.45%
100.00%
21
2
23
91.30%
8.70%
100.00%
41
29
70
58.57%
41.43%
100.00%
Pearson chi2(1) = 15.1256 Pr = 0.0001

See supra Part II.B.
This experience means that bankruptcy judges are likely to have significantly more expertise in this

area.
179

Bankruptcy cases only encompass a small percentage of the types of cases heard by district courts.
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Appellant
Creditor
Debtor
Total

Figure 11: Success on Appeal in the BAPs
Success on Appeal
No
Yes
12
11
52.17%
47.83%
5
2
71.43%
28.57%
17
13
56.67%
43.33%
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.8103
Pr = 0.368

[Vol. 30

Total
23
100.00%
7
100.00%
30
100.00%

These results show the district court is a place of little hope for the studentloan debtor. This data indicates a statistically significant finding in the
correlation between the appellant and their success on appeal with less than a
0.0001 probability that such finding was based on random chance alone. In the
district court, debtors’ success, whether or not they were the appellant, was
well below the overall averages shown in Figure 1.180 Although the findings
for debtors’ success on appeal in BAPs did not fall within the statistically
significant range, they do show that in the cases analyzed, debtors fared much
better in the BAP than in the district court.
Finally, Figure 12 shows the success rate of the debtor at the court of
appeals level:
Figure 12: Success on Appeal in the Courts of Appeals
Success on Appeal
Total
Appellant
No
Yes
9
10
19
Creditor
47.37%
52.63%
100.00%
17
6
23
Debtor
73.91%
26.09%
100.00%
26
16
42
Total
61.90%
38.10%
100.00%
Pearson chi2(1) = 3.1088
Pr = 0.078

Although the results of this analysis approached statistical significance (p =
0.078), it is interesting to note that in both the courts of appeals and the BAPs

180 As debtor-appellee, compare 42.55% in the district court to 46.07% in the overall findings from Figure
1. As debtor-appellant, compare 8.70% in the district court to 18.87% in the overall findings from Figure 1.
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the debtor fared considerably better than in the district court. Assuming that
results more favorable to the student-loan debtor than the unbalanced results
from Figure 1 are theoretically more in line with the Code’s intent, this
analysis bolsters the claim of the Nash/Pardo study that appellate panel courts
like the court of appeals and the BAP provide a higher level of quality
appellate review.181
Looking to further compare the results of this study to the findings from the
Nash/Pardo study of appellate review, Figure 13 illustrates the success rates of
debtors on appeal to circuit courts. Here, success for the debtor is defined as
either a case where the debtor appealed and the lower court’s decision was
overturned or when a creditor appealed and the lower court’s decision was
either fully or partly affirmed. Figure 13 is a compilation of findings from
forty-two observed cases in the different courts of appeals, thirty of which
were appealed from the district courts and twelve of which were appealed from
BAPs:
Figure 13: Success Rate for Debtors in Circuit Courts
Court of Appeals
Creditor Appeals from BAPs

37.50%

Debtor Appeals from BAPs

25.00%

Total Appeals from BAPs

33.33%

Overall BAP Affirmance

50.00%

Creditor Appeals from DCs

54.55%

Debtor Appeals from DCs

26.32%

Total Appeals from DCs

36.67%

Overall DC Affirmance

66.67%

Overall Affirmance

61.90%

This table shows that the courts of appeals affirmed 61.90% of all undue
hardship decision brought under its purview. However, the affirmance rate was
considerably higher on decisions appealed from district courts.182 Interestingly
though, the debtor seemed to fare better in the courts of appeals when the

181

See Nash & Pardo, supra note 94, at 1747.
Compare 66.67% affirmance rate in appeals from district courts to 50% affirmance rate in appeals
from BAPs.
182
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appeal originated from a district court. These figures, though they do not
directly bolster the results of the Nash/Pardo study, possibly indicate support
for the value of panel review. Assuming once more that decisions which favor
the student-loan debtor more than the unbalanced results from Figure 1 are
theoretically more in line with what the Code intended, then higher success
rates for debtors in appeals from district courts are evidence of the circuit
courts leveling out the playing field, or at least bringing the results of the
district court, where debtors fared poorly,183 more on par with the results from
the BAPs.184
CONCLUSION
The observations presented here evidence a trend in appellate courts of
applying a progressively harsher standard of review in undue hardship
determinations. Increasingly limited by precedent, courts applying the two tests
find they have little choice but to find student-loan debts nondischargeable.
The findings in this Comment show that many of the characteristics presumed
to forecast success have little impact as to the debtor’s success on appeal. The
presence of a medical condition, though, appears to still be a differentiating
factor, often allowing the debtor a more equitable opportunity to win his case.
It still seems, though, that the appellate courts have chosen to take a consistent,
but harsh approach to interpreting whether or not a debtor has satisfied the
undue hardship test.
For practitioners, this finding means taking a careful look to see whether it
is wise to move forward on an appeal, or if appeal is made, whether it might be
wise to take a settlement offer. Furthermore, this study may indicate that if an
appeal is chosen, then it might be wise for a debtor to go to a BAP, if
possible.185 For courts, this study calls for some reflection on why such a harsh
standard is being applied at the appellate level. Though student loans are
unique in their difficulty to discharge, one court, at least, has noted:
Despite Congress’ proven willingness to amend § 523(a)(8) to further
restrict the dischargeability of student loan debt, and in spite of the
availability of the ICRP option for repayment of student loans,

183

See supra Figure 10.
See supra Figure 11. This assertion is reinforced by the fact that the results in Figures 11 and 12 are
substantially the same.
185 Note that there is still an opt out choice for either party to choose to go to a district court instead of a
BAP. 11 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1) (2012).
184
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Congress chose to continue the undue hardship exception to
nondischargeability. Indeed, provisions in the House and Senate bills
designed to make student loans conclusively nondischargeable were
stripped from the bills in favor of maintaining § 523(a)(8)’s undue
186
hardship exception to nondischargeability of student loan debt.

The continued presence of the availability of discharge for student-loan debtors
suggests that courts should take a second look at their approach to undue
hardship determinations to see if they are really conforming to the Code’s
intent. If Congress has not been willing to do away with the option of
dischargeability for student-loan debt, then perhaps the lopsided results from
this study indicate a system in need of reexamination, and, ultimately, a more
lenient approach to student-loan debt discharge.
RYAN FREEMAN∗
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APPENDIX
Table A1
Debtor-Appellant Income Distribution When Appeal Outcome Was Full/Part
Affirm
1%
5%
10%
25%

Percentiles
124.17
124.17
846.36
1120

50%

1680.47

75%
90%
95%
99%

3300
3642.48
3666.67
3666.67

Smallest
124.17
847.36
1000
1120

Largest
3300
3419
3642.48
3666.67

Obs
Sum of Wgt.

15
15

Mean
Std. Dev.

2064.193
1137.134

Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis

1293074
0.13167
1.79294

Table A2
Debtor-Appellant Income Distribution When Appeal Outcome Was Full
Reversal
1%
5%
10%
25%

Percentiles
891
891
891
1232.105

50%

1529.5

75%
90%
95%
99%

1974.665
2329.17
2329.17
2329.17

Smallest
891
1063.21
1401
1459

Largest
1600
1650
2299.33
2329.17

Obs
Sum of Wgt.

8
8

Mean
Std. Dev.

1586.589
517.1514

Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis

267445.6
0.31294
1.99209

The two tables above set forth summary statistics for the distribution of the
debtor’s income based on the outcome of the appeal for those cases where the
debtor was the appellant (i.e., debtorapp==1). Thus, for cases where the debtor
was the appellant and the court fully or partly affirmed the judgment below,
the median income was $1,680.47 and the mean income $2,064.19. For
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cases where the debtor was the appellant and the court fully reversed the
judgment below (i.e., a complete win for the debtor), the median income was
$1,529.50 and the mean income was $1,586.59.
Table A3
Creditor-Appellant Income Distribution When Appeal Outcome Was Full/Part
Affirm
1%
5%
10%
25%

Percentiles
405
868
946
1132

50%

1827.5

75%
90%
95%
99%

3300
4355.48
5264.58
5500

Smallest
405
868
946
991

Largest
3842.04
4355.48
5264.58
5500

Obs
Sum of Wgt.

26
26

Mean
Std. Dev.

2194.355
1402.654

Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis

1967439
0.968103
2.926138

Table A4
Creditor-Appellant Income Distribution When Appeal Outcome Was Full
Reversal
1%
5%
10%
25%

Percentiles
700
760
946
1143

50%

2030.72

75%
90%
95%
99%

2524
3208
3574.56
4033.33

Smallest
700
760
918
946

Largest
3208
3300
3574.56
4033.33

Obs
Sum of Wgt.

33
33

Mean
Std. Dev.

2087.118
853.8859

Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis

729121.1
0.292728
2.389843

The two tables above set forth summary statistics for the distribution of the
debtor’s monthly income based on the outcome of the appeal for those cases
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where the creditor was the appellant (i.e., debtorapp==0). Thus, for cases
where the creditor was the appellant and the court fully or partly affirmed the
judgment below, the median income was $1,827.50 and the mean income
$2,194.36. For cases where the creditor was the appellant and the court fully
reversed the judgment below (i.e., a complete win for the creditor), the median
income was $2,030.72 and the mean income was $2,087.12.
Table A5
Logistic Regression Model for Effect of Income on Appellate Decision
Number of Obs =

Log Likelihood = -56.618

82

LR chi2 (1) =

0.44

Prob > chi2 =

0.507

Pseudo R2 =

0.0039

appoutcome

Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

P>|z|

Income

-0.0001

0.00021

-0.66

0.509

-0.0005

0.00027

0.283

0.48182

0.59

0.557

-0.6613

1.22736

_cons

[95% Conf. Interval]

The table above indicates that the debtor’s income (income) is not a
statistically significant predictor of the outcome on appeal (appoutcome),
z = -0.66, p = 0.509. The table results are from a logistic regression, with the
appeal outcome (appoutcome) as the dependent variable and the income of the
debtor (income) as the independent (i.e., predictor) variable.
Table A6
Debtor-Appellant Expenses Distribution When Appeal Outcome Was Full/Part
Affirm
Percentiles
1%
5%
10%
25%

492
492
1100
1619.27

50%

1829.39

75%
90%
95%
99%

2600
3387
3416.67
3416.67

Smallest
492
1100
1300
1619.27
Largest
2600
2771
3387
3416.67

Obs
Sum of Wgt.

13
13

Mean
Std. Dev.

2024.025
859.4745

Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis

738696.3
0.138138
2.348373
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Table A7
Debtor-Appellant Expenses Distribution When Appeal Outcome Was Full
Reversal
1%
5%
10%

Percentiles
1074
1074
1074

Smallest
1074
1161
1575

25%

1161

1785

50%

1680

75%
90%
95%
99%

2229.17
2229.05
2229.05
2229.05

Largest
1575
1785
2229.17
2229.05

Obs
Sum of
Wgt.

6
6

Mean
Std. Dev.

1686.537
517.3519

Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis

267653
0.015347
1.477827

The two tables above set forth summary statistics for the distribution of the
debtor’s expenses based on the outcome of the appeal for those cases where the
debtor was the appellant (i.e., debtorapp==1). Thus, for cases where the debtor
was the appellant and the court fully or partly affirmed the judgment below,
the median debtor had monthly expenses of $1,829.39 and the mean debtor had
monthly expenses of $2,024.03. For cases where the debtor was the appellant
and the court fully reversed the judgment below (i.e., a complete win for the
debtor), the median debtor had monthly expenses of $1,680 and the mean
debtor had monthly expenses of $1,686.54.
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Table A8
Creditor-Appellant Expenses Distribution When Appeal Outcome Was
Full/Part Affirm
Percentiles
1%
5%
10%

830
948
1172

Smallest
830
948
1172

25%

1404

1234

50%

2111

75%
90%
95%
99%

3575
5171
5913
5913

Largest
4327.47
5171
5913
5913

Obs
Sum of
Wgt.

21
21

Mean
Std. Dev.

2675.894
1591.528

Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis

2532962
0.832385
2.526385

Table A9
Creditor-Appellant Expenses Distribution When Appeal Outcome Was Full
Reversal

1%
5%
10%
25%

Percentiles
750
830
1022
1686.31

50%

2328

75%
90%
95%
99%

2619
3259
3657
3942

Smallest
750
830
1018.66
1022

Largest
3259
3626
3657
3942

Obs
Sum of Wgt.

34
34

Mean
Std. Dev.

2217.661
804.9414

Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis

647930.6
0.1090852
2.531794

The two tables above set forth summary statistics for the distribution of the
debtor’s expenses based on the outcome of the appeal for those cases where the
creditor was the appellant (i.e., debtorapp==0). Thus, for cases where the
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creditor was the appellant and the court fully or partly affirmed the judgment
below, the median debtor had expenses of $2,111 and the mean debtor had
monthly expenses of $2,675.89 For cases where the creditor was the appellant
and the court fully reversed the judgment below (i.e., a complete win for the
creditor), the median debtor had expenses of $2,328 and the mean debtor had
expenses of $2,217.66.
Table A10
Logistic Regression Model for Effect of Expenses on Appellate Decision
74
Number of Obs =
LR chi2 (1) =

Log Likelihood = -50.406495

Expenses
_cons

1.29

Prob > chi2 =

0.2568

Pseudo R2 =

0.0126

Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

-0.0002448

0.0002195

-1.11

0.265

-0.0006751

[95% Conf. Interval]
0.0001855

0.719345

0.5514051

1.3

0.192

-0.3613891

1.800079

The table results are from a logistic regression, with the appeal outcome
(appoutcome) as the dependent variable and the expenses of the debtor
(expenses) as the independent (i.e., predictor) variable. The table above
indicates that the amount of the debtor’s expenses (expenses) is not a
statistically significant predictor of the outcome on appeal (appoutcome),
z = -1.11, p = 0.265.
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Table A11
Debtor-Appellant Average Debt When Appeal Outcome Was Full/Part Affirm

1%
5%
10%

Percentiles
3000
11183.4
21865.3

Smallest
3000
11183.4
16312.34

25%

44500

21865.3

50%

68945.3

75%
90%
95%
99%

100000
142000
181743.4
297953

Largest
142000
161000
181743.4
297953

Obs
Sum of
Wgt.

37
37

Mean
Std. Dev.

79759.5
56498.73

Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis

3.19E+09
1.714819
7.217371

Table A12
Debtor-Appellant Average Debt When Appeal Outcome Was Full Reversal

1%
5%
10%

Percentiles
27781
27781
27781

Smallest
27781
45000
70000

25%

57500

73000

50%

77287.5

75%
90%
95%
99%

106283.5
359745
359745
359745

Largest
81575
85000
127567
359745

Obs
Sum of
Wgt.

8
8

Mean
Std. Dev.

108708.5
105596.8

Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis

1.12E+10
1.932742
5.29914

The two tables above set forth summary statistics for the distribution of the
debtor’s debt based on the outcome of the appeal for those cases where the
debtor was the appellant (i.e., debtorapp==1). Thus, for cases where the debtor
was the appellant and the court fully or partly affirmed the judgment below,
the median debtor had average debt of $68,945.30 and the mean debtor had
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average debt of $79,759.50. For cases where the debtor was the appellant and
the court fully reversed the judgment below (i.e., a complete win for the
debtor), the median debtor had average debt of $77,287.50 and the mean
debtor had average debt of $108,708.50.
Table A13
Creditor-Appellant Average Debt When Appeal Outcome Was Full/Part
Affirm
1%
5%
10%

Percentiles
15662
16215.08
20000

Smallest
15662
16215.08
18500

25%

38978.2

20000

50%

63109.87

75%
90%
95%
99%

100000
240000
283354.5
304463.6

Largest
240000
283354.5
283354.5
304463.6

Obs
Sum of
Wgt.

37
37

Mean
Std. Dev.

86133.69
75888.02

Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis

5.76E+09
1.733684
5.205519

Table A14
Creditor-Appellant Average Debt When Appeal Outcome Was Full Reversal
1%
5%
10%

Percentiles
7038.21
11715.25
18263.4

Smallest
7038.21
11293.68
11715.25

25%

33000

12148.7

50%

61800

75%
90%
95%
99%

89832.16
150782.9
217920
304463.6

Largest
16000
217920
235000
304463.6

Obs
Sum of
Wgt.

45
45

Mean
Std. Dev.

75266.94
61293.43

Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis

3.76E+09
1.803723
6.671375
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The two tables above set forth summary statistics for the distribution of the
debtor’s debt based on the outcome of the appeal for those cases where the
creditor was the appellant (i.e., debtorapp==0). Thus, for cases where the
creditor was the appellant and the court fully or partly affirmed the judgment
below, the median debtor had average debt of $63,109.87 and the mean debtor
had average debt of $86,133.69. For cases where the creditor was the appellant
and the court fully reversed the judgment below (i.e., a complete win for the
creditor), the median debtor had average debt of $61,000 and the mean debtor
had average debt of $75,266.94.
Table A15
Logistic Regression Model for Effect of Average Debt on Appellate Decision

Log Likelihood = -86.261702
Coef.
Std. Err.
Debt
-5.86E-07
2.70E-06
_cons
-2.859136 0.2838156

Number of Obs =
LR chi2 (1) =
Prob > chi2 =
Pseudo R2 =
z
P>|z|
-0.22
0.828
-1.01
0.314

127
0.05
0.8274
0.0003
[95% Conf. Interval]
-5.87E-06
4.70E-06
-0.8421819 0.2703548

The table results are from a logistic regression, with the appeal outcome
(appoutcome) as the dependent variable and the amount of debt (debt) as the
independent (i.e., predictor) variable. The amount of debt is not a statistically
significant predictor of the outcome on appeal, z = -0.22, p = 0.828.
Table A16
Success on Appeal, 1st Circuit
Success on Appeal
Appellant
Creditor
Debtor
Total

Total

No

Yes

3

6

9

33.33%

66.67%

100.00%

3

0

3

100.00%

0.00%

100.00%

6

6

12

50.00%

50.00%

100.00%

Fisher’s exact = 0.182

1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.091
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Table A17
Success On Appeal, 2nd Circuit
Success on Appeal

Total

Appellant

No
1

1

2

Creditor

50.00%

50.00%

100.00%

4

0

4

100.00%

0.00%

100.00%

5

1

6

83.33%

16.67%

100.00%

Debtor
Total

Yes

Fisher’s exact = 0.333

1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.333

Table A18
Success on Appeal, 3rd Circuit
Success on Appeal
Appellant
Creditor
Debtor
Total

Total

No

Yes

2

0

2

100.00%

0.00%

100.00%

3

1

4

75.00%

25.00%

100.00%

5

1

6

83.33%

16.67%

100.00%

Fisher’s exact = 1.000

1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.667
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Table A19
Success on Appeal, 4th Circuit
Success on Appeal
Appellant
Creditor
Debtor
Total

Total

No

Yes

3

10

13

23.08%

76.92%

100.00%

5

4

9

55.56%

44.44%

100.00%

8

14

22

36.36%

63.64%

100.00%

Fisher’s exact = 0.187

1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.135

Table A20
Success on Appeal, 5th Circuit
Success on Appeal
Appellant
Creditor
Debtor
Total

Total

No

Yes

1

3

4

25.00%

75.00%

100.00%

3

0

3

100.00%

0.00%

100.00%

4

3

7

57.14%

42.86%

100.00%

Fisher’s exact = 0.143

1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.114
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Table A21
Success on Appeal, 6th Circuit
Success on Appeal
Appellant
Creditor
Debtor
Total

Total

No

Yes

8

5

13

61.54%

38.46%

100.00%

3

0

3

100.00%

0.00%

100.00%

11

5

16

68.75%

31.25%

100.00%

Fisher’s exact = 0.509

1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.295

Table A22
Success on Appeal, 7th Circuit
Success on Appeal
Appellant
Creditor
Debtor
Total

Total

No

Yes

2

4

6

33.33%

66.67%

100.00%

4

1

5

80.00%

20.00%

100.00%

6

5

11

54.55%

45.45%

100.00%

Fisher’s exact = 0.242

1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.175
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Table A23
Success on Appeal, 8th Circuit
Success on Appeal
Appellant
Creditor
Debtor
Total

Total

No

Yes

10

4

14

71.43%

28.57%

100.00%

3

0

3

100.00%

0.00%

100.00%

13

4

17

76.47%

23.53%

100.00%

Fisher’s exact = 0.541

1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.421

Table A24
Success on Appeal, 9th Circuit
Success on Appeal
Appellant
Creditor
Debtor
Total

No

Total
Yes

5

8

13

38.46%

61.54%

100.00%

11

4

15

73.33%

26.67%

100.00%

16

12

28

57.14%

42.86%

100.00%

Fisher’s exact = 0.125

1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.069
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Table A25
Success on Appeal, 10th Circuit
Success on Appeal
Appellant

No

Total
Yes

4

2

6

Creditor

66.67%

33.33%

100.00%

3

0

3

Debtor

100.00%

0.00%

100.00%

7

2

9

77.78%

22.22%

100.00%

Total

Fisher’s exact = 0.500

1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.417

Table A26
Success on Appeal, 11th Circuit
Success on Appeal
Appellant
Creditor
Debtor
Total

No

Total
Yes

2

5

7

28.57%

71.43%

100.00%

1

0

1

100.00%

0.00%

100.00%

3

5

8

37.50%

62.50%

100.00%

Fisher’s exact = 0.375

1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.375

